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Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications
Katherine Shaw Spaht"
Marriage cultivates virtue by offering love, care, and nurture to its
members, and by holding out a model of charity, education, and
sacrifice to the broader community. Marriage enhances the life of a
man and a woman by providing them with a community of caring and
sharing, of stability and support, of nurture and welfare .... Marriage
enhances the life of the child by providing it with a chrysalis of nurture
and love, with a highly individualized form of socialization and
education. It might take a whole village to raise a child properly, but
it takes a marriage to make one.... [For] [t]he procreation of children
can be among the most important Words we have to utter.'
I. INTRODUCTION: "FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN"
To preserve and to nurture those most important Words, our children,'
motivated the covenant marriage legislation,3 legislation that permits a husband
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law.
The author prepared the original House Bill No. 756 (the covenant marriage legislation) for
introduction by its principal author, Representative Tony Perkins, and testified in favor of the
legislation during hearings before the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure and the Senate
Committee on Judiciary A. The author wishes to express her deepest gratitude to Representative
Perkins; to his original co-author Representative Jim Donelon; to Judge Darrell White, who
introduced the three of us; to Mary Ann Glendon, Maggie Gallagher, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, and
Glenn Stanton, whose cogent books and articles convinced the author and others of the intrinsic value
of marriage and the compelling necessity to act immediately to rescue it; and to her "covenant"
husband, Paul, who has been a source of strength and comfort throughout twenty-seven years of
marriage.
1. John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion and Law in the Western
Tradition 219 (1997). "In a faint echo of the divine, children are the most important Words most
of us will utter." Quoting from John E. Coons, The Religious Rights of Children, in Religious
Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives 172 (John Witte, Jr. and Johan van der
Vyver, eds., 1996).
The author's own most important Words are Holden, Lindley, and Carlos.
2. For an extensive examination of the reasons why a stable lifelong marriage of the parents
ofchildren insures the probability of their ultimate success and happiness, see Katherine Shaw Spaht,
For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 Notre Dame L Rev. 1547
(1998).
3. For example, see La. R.S. 9:307(A)(6)(b) (Supp. 1998). fthere is a minor child or
children of the marriage a divorce is permitted after legal separation only when the spouses have
lived separate and apart for one year and six months. If there is no minor child or children of the
marriage or if the legal separation was granted on the basis of abuse of a child of the marriage or
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and a wife to obligate themselves legally to a stronger, more enduring union.
4
The covenant marriage and its legal consequences more closely resemble the
promises made by each spouse in the wedding ceremony.5 The children of the
marriage are third party beneficiaries of the promises made by their parents6 and
one of the spouses, divorce after legal separation is permitted when the spouses have lived separate
and apart for only one year.
In her article entitled "It's Deja Vu All Over Again " The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular
Cultural Perception andLegal Reality, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1701 (1998), my friend Jeanne Carriere, who
.urges repeal of the law, failed to specifically consider the welfare of the children. The student
author, Melissa S. LaBauve of Comment, Covenant Marriages: A Guise for Lasting Commitment?,
43 Loy. L. Rev. 421 (1998), recognized that the legislature was motivated by the interests of
children: "The consequences of the dissolution of a marriage on the children are so strong in the
eyes of Louisiana legislators that they developed a new law aimed at curbing the effects of divorce."
Furthermore, the student author, Robert M. Gordon of Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107
Yale LJ. 1435,1438-42 (1997), acknowledged that there is a powerful "child-centered case" against
no-fault divorce, but then subtly dismisses its supporters as optimists and "develops the darker
sensibility of a skeptical liberalism." Id. at 1442.
4. See Christopher Wolfe, A Marriage of Your Choice, First Things, Feb. 1995, at 37, who
proposes a legislative option that is truly consistent with Christian marriage as reflected in Christ's
words in Mark 10:2-12, marriage that is indissoluble for any reason. The same option was proposed
in 1945 by French law professor, Leon Mazeaud of the University of Paris in Solution to the Problem
of Divorce which appears in Henri Mazeaud et al., Lecons de Droit Civil: La Famille bk. 1, vol. 3,
nos. 1413-15, at 649-52 (Laurent Levenuer ed., 7th ed. 1995). See Cynthia Samuel, Letter From
Louisiana: An Obituaryfor Forced Heirship and A Birth Announcement for Covenant Marriage, 12
Tul. Eur. & Civ. L. For. (forthcoming 1998), in which she describes the proposal made by Mazeaud
to the commission to reform the Code Civil.
See also Eric Rasmussen and Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 495-96 (1998) (recommend permitting more contractual
options for marriage rather than only one as in covenant marriage, although without the freedom
permitted in commercial contracts). To the same effect but advocating a broader private ordering
of marriage and divorce, see Gary S. Becker, Why Every Married Couple Should Sign a Contract,
Bus. Week, Dec. 29, 1997, at 30. On both sides of the political and religious spectrum there is some
agreementwith Stake and Rasmussen: some homosexual activists see the dejuridification of marriage
as an opportunity for them to demand participation in the sacred institution of marriage and some
committed Christians believe that they live in Babylon and prefer to construct their own law rather
than be subject to Babylonian law. In addition some liertarians argue that marriage should be
completely privatized as a personal and religious ceremony, and the State should confer no special
status on marriage.
5. This is true of traditional wedding ceremonies, the vast majority of which take place in
churches. But see David Blankenhom, IDo?, First Things, Nov. 1997, at 14-15, in which he abhors
modem American marriage vows because they reflect a "loving relationship" of undetermined
duration created of the couple, by the couple, and for the couple. He makes the point in his article
that the marriage vow is deeply connected to the marriage relationship.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1978. They are not simply incidental beneficiaries, since (1) the third
party beneficiaries of any contract need not be named (Andrepont v. Acadian Drilling Co., 255 La.
347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969)) as long as they can be identified when the benefit is sought to be
enforced; (2) they are persons with whom the parties have both a legal (La. Civ. Code art. 227) and
factual relationship such that there exists the possibility of future liability (La. Civ. Code arts. 227,
229) once they are bom; and (3) they can accept the benefit stipulated in their favor (in this case
implicitly) at any time before revocation including by filing suit (La. Civ. Code art. 1979). For a
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benefit in both tangible and intangible ways-economically, ' physically,"
psychologically, and emotionally.9 Judith Wallerstein's unique twenty-five year
recent analogous example, see Sandi v. Palmer, 713 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998) (contract
between father and former wife and her husband to set up and fund trust for daughters).
See Margaret F. Brinig, Economics. Law and Covenant Marriage, 16 Gender Issues 4 (1998):
Legislation involving families typically produces results thatrange far beyond the husband
and wife involved. Children are the third parties most obviously affected by marriage
and divorce legislation. Two features of the Louisiana covenant marriage proposal seem
to benefit the offspring of a marriage. The first is that fewer couples will divorce, and,
since divorce almost always harms children, children will benefit The other interesting
feature of the legislation is the inclusion of abuse directed against a child as a grounds
both for absolute ... divorce and for a mensa divorce .... The only state currently
allowing fault divorces where it is not the spouse, but the child who is physically or
sexually injured, is West Virginia .... Covenant marriage should foster the kind of
permanence that would allow more specific investments in the marriage. This would
include not only degrees, but also children....
(Emphasis added).
See Amy S. Poling, Comment, Protecting the Interests of Children of Divorce: A Proposal to
Create Exceptions to the Louisiana Prohibition Against Contracting for Future Successions, 72 Tul.
L Rev. 1853 (1998).
7. Although Lenore Weitzman in her seminal work The Divorce Revolution: The Unintended
Social and Economic Consequences on Women and Children in America (1987) was the first to
document the economic devastation suffered by children (and women) after changes in divorce law
in the 1970's, numerous studies since the publication of her research support her conclusions. There
are disagreements about Weitzman's calculations of the disparity between post-divorce income and
standard of living for men and for women and children, but only a few dispute that women and
children suffer more economic hardship than men after divorce. See Saul Hoffman & Greg Duncan,
What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 Demography 641 (1988); Atlee L. Stroup &
Gene E. Pollock, Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, J. of Divorce and Remarriage 22
(1994); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 Am.
Soc. Rev. 528 (1996). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 809, 835 (1998).
In Brinig, supra note 6, the author explains the economic impact as follows: "[ihe same parties
now maintain two households, eliminating economies of scale that were present during the marriage.
Given the same incomes, the parties are effectively poorer because of increased costs."
8. See Patrick F. Fagan et al., The Child Abuse Crisis: The Disintegration of Marriage,
Family, and the American Community, Backgrounder, June 3, 1997. The report compiled data drawn
from the following studies: Andrea J. Sedlak & Diane Broadhurst, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, The Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (1996), and Robert R.
Whelan, Family Education Trust, Broken Homes & Battered Children: A Study of the Relationship
Between Child Abuse and Family Type (1994).
There is strong evidence from the British research that the structure of the family is
related directly to the safety of mothers and children. The most dangerous place for a
woman and her child is in an environment in which she is cohabiting with a boyfriend
who is not the father of her children. The rate of child abuse may be as much as 33 times
higher. Even cohabiting with the children's father may lead to a rate of abuse as much
as 20 times higher. Marriage provides the safest environment for children. It therefore
truly makes a difference in advancing the safety and well-being of America's children.
Fagan et al., supra, at 14.
9. See John Guidubaldi,Differencesin Children 's DivorceAdjustment Across Grade Level and
Gender: A Report from NASP-Kent State Nationwide Project, in Children of Divorce: Empirical
1998]
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longitudinal study of children of divorce establishes what the average citizen
intuited before the post-modem era:
Unlike the adult experience, the child's suffering does not reach its peak
at the breakup and then level off. On the contrary. Divorce is a
cumulative experience for the child. Its impact increases over time. At
each developmental stage the impact is experienced anew and in
different ways.... The impact of divorce gathers force as they reach
young adolescence, when they are often insufficiently supervised and
poorly protected, and when, additionally, they are required then (if not
earlier) to adjust to new stepparents and stepsiblings. The impact
gathers new strength again at late adolescence when they are financially
barred from choosing a career or obtaining an education equivalent to
that of their parents. And again, at young adulthood, when their fears
that their own adult relationships will fail like those of their parents rise
in crescendo. The effect of the parents' divorce is played and replayed
throughout the first three decades of the children's lives.'"
Despite criticism of the size and quality of her sample of children," her
findings have been affirmed by a myriad of other larger studies.'2 A survey of
Louisiana appellate court opinions on issues of succession law over the last
fifteen years reveals that the pain and anger experiencedby children of divorce
(referred to in those opinions as children of a "former marriage") outlive the
parent. 3 A Generation at Risk, written by Paul Amato and Alan Booth and
Perspectives on Divorce (Sharlene A. Wolchik & Paul Karoly eds., 1988); David Demo & Alan
Acock, The Impact of Divorce on Children: An Assessment of Recent Evidence, 50 J. Marriage &
Fam. 619, 622 (1988).
Glenn S. Stanton's Why Marriage Matters: Reasons to Believe in Marriage in Post-Modem
Society (1997) is one of the most recent of all the books written by authors who wish to emphasize
the positive effects of marriage. Stanton compiles all of the sociological data to date on the
detrimental effects of divorce. For example, see Chapter 5, "Shattering the Myth: The Broken
Promises of Divorce and Remarriage" at 123-58. See also Jenifer Kunz, The Effects of Divorce on
Children, in 2 Family Research: A Sixty-Year Review, 1930-1990, 325 (Stephen Bahr ed., 1992).
In Brinig, supra note 6: "The question for those evaluating restrictions on divorce is whether the
gains to adults' autonomy from the easier exits of no-fault regimes outweigh the apparently large
costs they inflict upon children."
10. Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A
First Report from a 25-Year Study, Presentation at the Second World Congress of Family Law and
the Rights of Children and Youth in San Francisco, California (June 2-7, 1997) (copy on file with
author).
1I. Her study has been criticized because the number of children was small (116-130 children)
and they all came from middle-class northern California families in 1970. Their parents were well-
educated.
12. See Stanton, supra note 9, at 123-58, for the results of those studies.
13. The author's devotion to the cause of forced heirship was almost exclusively based upon
the plight of children of a first marriage, and the recognition that some of the strongest pressure to
change the system of the children's legitime came from subsequent spouses (second, third wives).
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published in 1997, documents the two left-of-center authors' extensive research
findings about the effect of divorce on children and contains the compelling
statement: "Spending one-third of one's life living in a marriage that is less than
satisfactory in order to benefit children-children that parents elected to bring
into the world-is not an unreasonable expectation."' 4  Dr. Wade E. Hom,
reviewing the Amato and Booth findings and two other studies, recently
commented in a newspaper article: "[Clonventional wisdom tells us that it's
better for the children if their parents divorce than if they stay in an unhappy
marriage .... Only trouble is, both conventional wisdom and the experts, it
turns out, are wrong. Three new studies point to divorce-not marital
conflict-as the problem." ' s  As Barbara Dafoe Whitehead so eloquently
summarizes:
In a culture of divorce, children are the most "unfree." Divorce
abrogates children's rights to be reasonably free from adult cares and
woes, to enjoy the association of both parents on a daily basis, to
remain innocent of social services and therapy, and to spend family time
in ways that are not dictated by the courts.... [D]ivorce involves a
radical redistribution of hardship, from adults to children, and therefore
cannot be viewed as a morally neutral act. 6
See Cynthia Samuel et al., Successions and Donations: Cases and Readings 592-93 (1996); Katherine
Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 La. L Rev.
55 (1996); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Aftermath of the "Revolution'" 1990 Changes to the New
Forced Heirship Law, 51 La. L Rev. 469,471(1991); Katherine Shaw Spahtet al., The New Forced
Heirship Law: A Regrettable "Revolution ", 50 La. L Rev. 409,411 (1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht
et al., Developments in the Law--Successions and Donations, 45 La. L Rev. 575 (1984). See also
Comment, supra note 6.
Professor Cynthia A. Samuel of Tulane Law School in Samuel, supra note 4, treats the subjects
of the demise of all-inclusive forced heirship and the enactment of covenant marriage legislation
together in her article. In the mind of the author they are inherently connected-widespread divorce
created pressure to repeal the law that reserved a portion ofone's property for all children. "In 1995
the tide of divorce was primarily what swept Louisiana's law of forced heirship out to sea. But in
1997 when the tide came in again, it contained an unexpected hostility to divorce."
Both easy divorce and the repeal of all-inclusive forced heirship represent the triumph ofa radical
individualism, inherently selfish and narcissistic. Civil institutions such as lifelong marriage enforced
by strict laws of divorce and the reserve of property for children at death necessarily curbed a
citizen's narcissism. What now passes for "liberty" is often more properly understood as undisguised
selfish "license."
See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (1991).
14. Paul A. Amato & Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family
Upheaval 238 (1997).
15. Wade E. Hom, Strong Casefor Staying Together DespiteDiscord, Washington Times, Jan.
6, 1998, at E2. The other two studies were Rex Forehand et al., Is Adolescent Adjustment Following
Parental Divorce a Function of Predivorce Adjustment?, 25 J. Abnormal Child Psychol. 157 (1997)
and Ronald L Simons, Understanding Differences Between Divorced and Intact Families: Stress
Interaction and Child Outcome 203-05 (1996).
16. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture 184, 190 (1997).
1998]
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As poignant as these findings and conclusions, social scientists are
increasingly convinced that the weakening 7 and virtual collapse of marriage
explain the exploding phenomena of cohabitation. Maggie Gallagher in her book
The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love persuasively argues
that there is an indisputable connection between the weak institution we now call
marriage, which is defined in no small part by divorce law," and the irregular
living arrangement known as cohabitation.
There seems to be a tipping point at which marriage becomes so fragile
and divorce so common that an increasing number of women decide it
may be safer to dispense with marriage altogether: Illegitimacy surges
in the wake of a surge in divorce. 9
David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, two names well-known among
social scientists and in the popular culture,2" have completed a massive study
of countries throughout the West and conclude that in countries where marriage
as an institution is weakest, cohabitation is the most widespread.2' In other
17. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 12
BYU J. Pub. L. 277 (1998). See also Janet L. Dolgin, The Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and
the Client Who Chooses Not to Choose, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 31, 39-40 (1998).
18. See id., in which the author argues that the definition of marriage which includes
permanency has been so diluted and weakened by easy divorce that it is no surprise homosexuals can
demand entry into what was once a sacred institution distinguished historically by such attributes as
sexual complementarity and permanence. See David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex marriage? Baehr
v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1997). See also Elizabeth S. Scott and
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L Rev. (forthcoming 1998): "The
Louisiana statute grows out of a widespread dissatisfaction with the current social and legal landscape
of marriage and divorce, and a sense that marriage itself is threatened under no-fault divorce law."
Contra: Ira Mark Eliman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract. Opportunistic Violence, and
Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 719. It should be pointed out that
Professor Ellman is the Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute's Principles of Family
Dissolution and has consistently resisted, and his writings reflect why, the injection of fault into
divorce proceedings with one notable exception, physical violence.
19. Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love 123 (1996).
See Marriage U.S.A., World Magazine (Sept. 19, 1998), in which the recently released figures in
"Marital Status and Living Arrangements" by the United States Census Bureau show a steady
increase in the number of unmarried couples in America. The article also includes studies by Illinois
and Wisconsin researchers describing the bleak outlook for cohabiting couples which prompted
Robert Knight of the Family Research Council to comment: "Until we hit rock bottom and.., see
the damage ... it's likely that large numbers of people will continue to live together."
20. See David Popenoe, Fostering the New Familism: A Goal for America, Responsive
Community (Fall, 1992); David Popenoe, The Family Condition in America, Values & Pub. Policy
(1994); David Popenoe, Decline & Renewal of Marriage in America, in Promises to Keep (Inst. for
Social Research, Univ. of Michigan); and David Popenoe, The Evolution of Marriage and the
Problem of Stepfamilis: A Biosocial Perspective of Stepfamilies: Who Benefits? Who Does Not?
(1994). These articles are only a selected few from a list that exceeds forty articles and books.
Whitehead, supra note 16; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, The Atlantic
Monthly, Apr. 1993, at 47.
21. David Popenoe & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Cohabitation in America: A Report to the
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words, if marriage is a weak institution, what's the point of it, a conclusion that
has so alarmed Popenoe and Whitehead that they have founded "The Marriage
Project" at Rutgers University. Not surprisingly, broken families22 lead to
families that never form.
If a father and a mother committed to each other through lifelong mar-
riage" represents the ideal environment for the rearing of responsible, prosper-
ous, and well-adjusted citizens,24 can the law restore and strengthen the
Nation, National Marriage Project at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (forthcoming fall,
1998). See also Scott and Scott, supra note 18: "If the state extends privileges and benefits to
married couples that are not offered to individuals or cohabiting couples, the value of marriage
increases as compared to alternatives, and getting and staying married becomes more attractive." The
authors cite as general authority Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 Chi. L Rev. 133 (1996).
This study essentially undercuts Katharine T. Bartlett's notion of a "family-enabling model of
reform" that treats all family structures as potentially desirable, including the cohabitation model, and
suggests legal rules to govem such structures (gay and lesbian marriage, etc.). See Bartlett, supra
note 7. The "reformers" to which Bartlett refers in the title to her article are trying to save the family
from earlier reformers.
See also Allan Carlson, The Family, Public Policy & Democracy: Lessons from the Swedish
Experiment, 12 The Family in America (newsletter of The Howard Center for Family Religion &
Society, August, 1998): "The central error in the Swedish model lies at the very beginning: in the
assumption that the human family is malleable, a derivative social construct ever adjusting to meet
new economic conditions, rather than a system rooted in a relatively fixed human nature" Id. at 7.
22. Family is defined as a father and mother united by marriage with biological or adoptive
children. The family is broken by divorce because either the father or the mother is no longer
present in the home. The tragic result is broken everything: "Broken homes. Broken promises.
Broken hearts. Broken marriages. Broken ideals. Broken lives. Broken minds. Broken laws.
Broken bodies. Broken societies. Broken people. Broken ... everything is broken." Stanton, supra
note 9, at 159.
For a different more inclusive view of family, see, eg., Bartlett, supra note 7.
23. See Stanton, supra note 9, at 105. He summarizes the findings of the study by Sara
McLanahan & Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single-Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (1994),
and then quotes them as follows: "Regardless ofwhich survey we look at, children from one-parent
families are about twice as likely to drop out of school as children from two-parent families."
McLanahan & Sandefur, id. at 41.
"It is no exaggeration to say that a stable, two-parent family is an American child's best protection
against poverty." Kamarck & Galston, Progressive Policy Institute, Putting Children First: A
Progressive Family Policy for the 1990s, at 12 (1990).
See also David Blankenhom, Fatherless America (1995).
24. In the "Call to a Civil Society" the result of two years of discussion and drafting and
released by the Institute for American Values, on May 28, 1998, the authors, who include Professor
Mary Ann Glendon, David Blankenhom, Professor Don Browning, Professor James Q. Wilson,
Senator Dan Coats, and Senator Joe Lieberman, recommend that to renew our democracy morally
America should first, increase the likelihood that more children will grow up with their two married
parents. One of the specific recommendations that pertains to the family is number 8:
We hope that state legislatures will consider reforming no-fault divorce laws. The twin
purposes of reform are lowering the divorce rate and improving the quality of marriage.
Ideas for reform include: extending the waiting period for divorce; establishing incentives
or requirements for pre-marital education and for marital counseling in cases of at-risk
marriages; and, in cases in which only one spouse wants the divorce, requiring the
1998]
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institution of marriage?2s Law played an indispensable role in the near-
destruction of marriage, 26 so surely it can and must in light of its complicity,
contribute to the rehabilitation of marriage-for the sake of the children. How
best to restore the ideal of eternal, self-sacrificial love is the question. Although
the debate is far from over even in Louisiana,27 covenant marriage legislation,
establishment of fault. Another potentially promising reform is "covenant marriage"
legislation, recently adopted in Louisiana and now being considered in other states, which
permits individual couples to opt out of the no-fault system and enter Into a legally more
binding marriage.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
25. See Spaht, supra note 2, at 1559-62, in which the author argues that the interrelationship
of law and culture, particularly in this country, is symbiotic.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has always recognized the influence of law on the culture. See Mary
Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981); Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law (1987) [hereinafter Abortion and Divorce]; Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation
Under Lawyers (1994). "Concerning divorce law in the United States, as Professor Glendon has
observed, it has come 'to embody the idea that termination of a marriage (is] a matter of individual
right"' Spaht, supra note 2, at 1559-60 (quoting Glendon, Abortion and Divorce, supra note 25,
at 113).
Even the student author, Melissa Lawton of Note, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage
Laws, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2471,2507 (1998), acknowledges that liberals agree that "law influences
how people behave, and individuals perceive other people and institutions.... ." See also id. at n.320
and authorities cited therein.
26. See Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel
Data, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 608 (1998). The author observes: "States that adopted divorce laws which
were more strongly unilateral had greater increases in the divorce rate. Nevertheless, the evidence
shows that adopting any type of unilateral divorce raised the divorce rate." To the same effect, see
Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At Fault People, 18 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
(forthcoming 1998) (no-fault divorce significantly increased divorce rates because the costs of filing
for divorce decreased; study isolated effect of legal variable from other demographic and social
factors).
Glendon, Abortion and Divorce, supra note 25; Carl E. Schneider, Marriage. Morals, and the
Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 503; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9, 29-37 (1990); Margaret F. Brinig
& Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. Legal Stud. 869 (1994); Lynn D. Wardle,
No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 79; Judith Younger, Marital
Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for
Reform, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (1981); William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, 124 Pub.
Interest 12 (1996).
But see Note, supra note 3, at 1435, in which the author argues that the effect of law is limited.
In doing so he merely echoes what many academics have said before. See Ellman & Lohr, supra
note 18.
27. H.R. No. I (Reg. Sess. 1998):
WHEREAS, on September 5,1969, California enacted the first no-fault divorce law and
within five years thereof forty-four other states enacted similar legislation; and
WHEREAS, the state of Louisiana also enacted similar no-fault legislation pursuant to
which a majority of divorces in this state are granted; and
WHEREAS, Louisiana's "no-fault" grounds are provided in Civil Code Articles 102 and
103 which simply requife that the spouses have lived separate and apart for one hundred
eighty days prior to the filing of the rule to show cause, or that the spouses have lived
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first introduced in Florida in 199028 and now the law in both Louisiana and
Arizona,29 answers the question by making the ideal a matter of choice-what
"communitarians" refer to as "opportuning virtue."'3 In addition to the obvious
virtues cultivated by marriage, the selection of covenant marriage encourages the
virtue of keeping one's promises, which ironically is required in simple
contractual relationships with strangers. Furthermore, because a covenant
marriage is a choice made by the couple, the legislation offers the possibility of
eventually changing the culture.3 To promote the selection of a stronger
separate and apart continuously for a period of six months or more on the date the petition
is filed; and
WHEREAS, according to a news release of the American Bar Association, nearly thirty
years after no-fault divorce was first introduced in the United States, many state legislators
are trying to reinstate fault as a prerequisite for divorce in their states.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the House of Representatives of the Legislature
of Louisiana does hereby request that the Louisiana State Law Institute study and make
recommendations to the Civil Law and Procedure Committee as to the merits of
reinstating fault as a prerequisite to a divorce....
See also S.B. No. 160 (1997 Reg. Sess.) by Senator Max Jordan provided that couples with
children under the age of 18 could not divorce without proving fault grounds. The amended bill
passed out of Senate Committee Judiciary A without objection but was defeated on the Senate floor
by a vote of 12-25.
28. Fla. H.R. 1585 (1990). See Spaht, supra note 2, at 1573 n.10.
29. Ariz. R.S. 25-901-906 (1998). The bill was signed by the Governor on May 21, 1998.
See Len Munsil, Proposal Weeds Out Less Committed and Ira Mark Ellman, Senate Bill Revives
Horror of Fault Divorce, Ariz. Rep. at B5, Mar. 6, 1998. See also Louisiana's Covenant Marriage
Low, 1 Married 14 (1997) (magazine of National Ass'n of Marriage Enhancement in Phoenix, Ariz.)
(cover story).
30. In fact, the Communitarian Network has produced a booklet entitled, Opportuning Virtue:
Lessons to be Learned from Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A Communitarian Report (Amitai
Etzioni & Peter Rubin eds., 1997). In that publication is an article by Amitai Etzioni entitled How
to Make Marriage Matter from Time Magazine, Sept. 6, 1993, at 73, in which he urges the
possibility at law of "super-vows" which incorporates the same notion as covenant marriage
legislation. See also William A. Galston, Progressive Family Policy for the Twenty-First Century,
Building the Bridge: 10 Big Ideas to Transform America 149, 156 (Will Marshall ed. 1997).
Margaret F. Brinig in her article, Brinig, supra note 6, concludes with the observation: "It[covenant marriage legislation] allows the noble sentiments and incentives that lie behind covenant
marriage to precommit without completely extinguishing personal freedom. With the covenant
alternative in a federal system, contractual alternatives in family law widen considerably, and to good
ends."
31. See Joe Loconte, I'll Stand Bayou, 89 Policy Rev. 30, 32-33 (1998), in which the author
refers to covenant marriage as a sleeping giant: "Covenant marriage uses both law and civil society
to confront couples with the nature of their marriage commitment. Such confrontation could help
rewrite our nation's most troubling cultural tale." Id. at 34.
The observation in footnote 131 in Carriere, supra note 3, at 1721, attributed to her colleague
Harvey Couch that those who initially select the option of a covenant marriage will be those who are
least likely to divorce is at least partially true. As one might expect, those initially opting into a
covenant marriage in Louisiana are generally deeply committed Christians. See Jeff Hooten, Tying
the Knot a Whole Lot lIghter, 12 Citizen Mag. 6 (1998). However, Christian denominations are not
immune from divorce; in fact, the number of divorces in Christian denominations is roughly equal
to the overall divorce rate in the United States. Id. at 9.
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marital commitment, proponents of covenantmarriage must convince each couple
of the desirability of covenant marriage, which requires intensive missionary
work, winning converts one couple at a time.
This article explores how covenant marriage legislation attempts to
strengthen marriage through the legal commitment of "covenant couples." By
their example and public discussion of the optional covenant marriage, 2 the
cultural perception of marriage could gradually shift to the point of
acceptance of a new, yet at the same time very old, paradigm 33-lifelong
marriage. Then the author discusses in detail the provisions of the
covenant marriage legislation and the legal implications of its enactment on
Louisiana divorce law. In the process, the author will address some of the
criticisms of the covenant marriage legislation published elsewhere."' It is
Christ's view of marriage and divorce is best reflected in the passage in Mark 10: 2-12, in which
Jesus is addressing his disciples about his statements concerning divorce.
32. The importance of public debate of the disintegration of marriage and the consequences of
divorce for society is largely overlooked in the articles written criticizing the covenant marriage
legislation. For example, in Carriere's article, supra note 3, she dismisses the effectiveness of the
legislation because the numbers of couples selecting the option thus far are small and probably self-
selecting. See No Honeymoon for Covenant Marriage, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1998; Covenant
Marriage: Some do, more don't, Times Picayune, Aug. 17, 1998. One need only consider how
effective the recent public discussion (and in some cases misinformation) about the evils of tobacco
has been. Another example was the public discussion ensuing over civil rights during that
movement.
Ultimately, whether the option of covenant marriage can change the cultural attitude of the citizens
of Louisiana and Arizona toward marriage and divorce will be determined. The National Science
Foundation and The Center for the Family at Brigham Young University are financing the proposed
five-year empirical study of Professors Steve Nock at the University of Virginia, Laura Sanchez at
Tulane University, and Jim Wright at Tulane University of the proposition, "Can Louisiana's
(Arizona's) Covenant Marriage Law Solve America's Divorce Problem?" (emphasis added).
Others interested in "The Marriage Movement" hope to ignite the public debate using a community
marriage policy (see discussion in infra note 56): "'In public discourse, marriage is the "M" word,'
says Theodora Ooms of the Family Impact Seminar, in Washington, D.C. 'Nobody talks about it.'
So we are using the new marriage policy as a way to begin a public dialogue."' Roger Sider, Grand
Rapids Erects A Civic Tent for Marriage, 6 Policy Rev. 6-7 (July-Aug. 1998).
33. See Nicole D. Lindsey, Note, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of "7 Do. " An Analysis of
the Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 265 (1998).
34. For example, Carrierc, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3 (the effect of law on culture and
the principal arguments of the student author introduced with this sentence, "The child-centered case
against no-fault divorce, like the view it opposes, rests on a distinctive vision of human nature and
legal authority .. ", is addressed by the author elsewhere in Spaht, supra note 3); Comment, supra
note 3. See also Bartlett, supra note 7.
One criticism will not be addressed and that is that no one knew about the legislation (Stealth Anti-
Divorce Weapon, ABA J., Sept. 1997, at 28) because itis addressed elsewhere (Katherine Shaw Spaht,
Why Covenant Marriage? A Change in Culture For the Sake of the Children, 46 La. B.J. 116 (Aug.
1998) [hereinafter Why Covenant Marriage?]) and because in both Carriere's article and the student
comment in the Loyola Law Review the authors cite numerous newspaper articles written during the
period of time when the legislature was considering the covenant marriage legislation and published
in the two largest newspapers in the state, The Times Picayune and The Advocate. Every single one
of the articles, consisting of editorials and op-ed pieces, opposed the enactment of the legislation.
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remarkable in some cases-the American Civil Liberties Union 35-andpredictable in others-family law attorneys,3 6 feminists,37 and other liberal
Furthermore, to the criticism that the legislation was enacted in haste, the author's response is thatthat observation is simply not true and I was there. Secondly, to the criticism that other approachesshould have been adopted, such as a mandatory scheme (see Note, supra note 3, at 1441, myresponse is "been there, tried that." See supra note 27, describing a Senate Bill introduced duringthe 1997 session that would have imposed a scheme disallowing no-fault divorce if/the couple hadminor children. Third, to the criticism that the Law Institute should have been involved (seeComment, supra note 3), my response is "been there, tried that, too." See Katherine Shaw Spaht andKenneth Rigby, The New Divorce Legislation: Background and Commentary, 54 La. L Rev. 19,
20 (1993).
35. The only testimony offered in opposition to the covenant marriage legislation came fromthe American Civil Liberties Union. Liberties is highlighted because this august organization thatprotects our most precious liberties, such as the right to abort one's fetus, would deny two people
the liberty to contract a more binding marriage.In Note, supra note 25, at 2508, the author states: "The American Civil Liberties Union ('ACLU')takes another liberal view, arguing that covenant marriage laws are an impermissible joinder ofchurch and state insofar as the legislation incorporates Christian values into law. The ACLU assertsthat the term 'covenant' has biblical connotations and promotes marriages found in the Bible,complete with a dominant husband and submissive wife. Indeed, the original legislation wasproposed by a Promise Keeper, and graduate of Liberty University." Of course, the authorof this article drafted the legislation and testified in favor of it in both legislative
committees.
A staff attorney for the ACLU described the covenant marriage law as a "'Trojan horse' thatwould, in some cases, harm children by holding them hostage to bad marriages." Note, supra note
33, at 282 n.125.
36. After passage of the legislation, members of the family law section of the Louisiana StateBar Association attacked the bill. See The Stealth Anti-Divorce Weapon, supra note 34, at 28,quoting Randy Fuerst, an attorney in Lake Charles. See infra discussion in text at notes 90-94.37. Hard-core feminists are reported to be in opposition to covenant marriage legislationbecause they "find that the legislation's efforts to protect women from divorce demeaning, or worse,dangerous." Note, supra note 25, at 2508-11. "Covenant marriage laws fail to address 'the potentialfor oppression between the individual and other forms of organized social authority,' such as thefamily." Id. at 2510. This one sentence best sums up the feminist view of marriage andfamily--oppressive. Another example is the Note, supra note 33, at 280:Despite the fact that divorce generally resulted in a financial disadvantage for women, the
change from fault to no-fault FORCED women to become better educated, moremarketable, and consequently, more financially independent. To revert to a traditional,fault-based divorce system would ENCOURAGE women to resume traditional gender
roles, which emphasize the financial dependence of women on their spouses.(Emphasis added). Unlike these women, the author desires to offer women a choice.The feminists' ultimate agenda is best described in Carolyn Graglia's, Feminism Isn't Antisex. It'sOnly Antif/amily, Wall St. I., Aug. 6, 1998:
The founding principle of NOW was that women should abandon homemaking and child-rearing and enter the workplace so as to become economically and politically independentfrom men. Child care in the words of one critic of the domestic role is "boring, tedious,and lonely", being financially dependent on a husband is "irksome and humiliating."...Since their own interest in marriage was minimal, feminists encouraged women to
abandon the ideal of chastity and even of marital fidelity ...Mrs. Graglia is also the author of an excellent new book on the subject of the feminist agendaentitled Domestic Tranquility: A Brief Against Feminism (1998).
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groups 3.- who opposes a mere optional form of marriage and why, a
form which is entirely voluntary and chosen by the couple.
H". IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF THE COVENANT MARRIAGE LEGISLATION AND
HOW THE LEGISLATION ACCOMPLISHES THOSE OBJECTIVES
As much as we honor the institution of marriage, it would seem that
we should equally condemn divorce, for divorce is the enemy of mar-
riage... ." [D]ivorce inflicts the ultimate damage on marriage.... .0
Divorce, it is said, shatters the standing of marriage. It is dangerous
to make the conjugal bond too fragile. Marriages are contractedwith a
light heart, if the couple feel that there is a way out.... The objection
[that divorce shatters the standing of marriage] is decisive when divorce




The first and foremost objective of the covenant marriage legislation is to
strengthen the institution of marriage, principally for the sake of the children. The
legislation proposes to accomplish that objective by (1) mandatory pre-marital
counseling which stresses the seriousness of marriage and the expectationthat the
couple's marriage will be lifelong;4 (2) a legally binding agreement
43 in the
38. Other liberal views in opposition to covenant marriage legislation are described as those
views which highly value individual autonomy and free choice. Note, supra note 25, at 2507-09.
39. Sanders v. Gore, 676 So. 2d 866, 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (Yelverton, J., concurring
and dissenting).
Planiol believed that the institution of divorce was inimical to the institution of
marriage. In his treatise published nearly 60 years ago in 1939, he said "[Miodem
legislations, reacting against the Catholic principle of the absolute indissolubility of
marriage, returned to divorce ...... ... He deplored the increase in divorce, but noted
the still great difference between a divorce by modem legislations and the Roman Law:
modem legislations recognizing divorce only for specified causes, and Roman Law
permitting divorce contingent solely upon the will of the spouses....
Id. at 876.
40. Id. at 878.
41. 11 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law § 1143, at 635 (La. St. L. Inst. Trans. 1959),
quoted in Sanders v. Gore, 676 So. 2d 866, 876 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (Yelverton, J., concurring
and dissenting).
42. La. R.S. 9:273(AX2Xa) (Supp. 1998).
43. The agreement of husband and wife to "take all reasonable steps to preserve the marriage,
including marital counseling" is a legally binding contract permitted and sanctioned by the state as
a limited exception to the fundamental principle that the personal obligations of the marriage contract
may not be altered by the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 86, cmt. (b); La. Civ. Code art. 1968.
Generally, the personal obligations of husband and wife, including when the marriage terminates,
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Declaration of Intent that if difficulties arise during the marriage the spouses will
take all "reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marriage
counseling";" and (3) limited grounds for divorce making termination of the
marriage depend on either misconduct by a spouse within the marital relation-
ship4 s which society collectively condemns, or a lengthy waiting period of two
years living separate and apart." Each of these three legal mechanisms in
combination, it is hoped, will achieve the laudable purpose of strengthening
marriage; and each will be addressed separately in the sections of this article that
follow.
B. Revitalizing Mediating Structures: Inviting Religion to Assist In
Preserving Marriages
Another less obvious objective of the legislation, which is reflected in who
may perform the mandatory pre-marital counseling, is to revitalize and reinvigo-
rate the "community" known as the church. Reinvigoration results from inviting
religion back "into the public square"47 for the purpose of performing a function
for which religion is uniquely qualified-preserving marriages. A minister,4
cannot be made the object of a contract because they are matters of public order. See Holliday v.
Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (1976).
44. La. R.S. 9:273(AXI) (Supp. 1998). See also La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2Xa) (Supp. 1998). See
infra discussion in text at notes 182-279.
45. La. R.S. 9:307(A) and (B) (Supp. 1998), such as adultery, conviction of a felony and
sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor or death, abandonment for one year, physical abuse of a
spouse or a child of the parties, and a legal separation for cruel treatment (mental cruelty)
or habitual intemperance that renders the life together insupportable plus an additional one year or
one year and one hundred eighty days of living separate and apart. See infra discussion in text at
notes 280-458.
46. La. R.S. 9:307(AX5) (Supp. 1998). This ground for divorce in a covenant marriage is
considered to be an example of unilateral no-fault divorce. The significant difference between
unilateral no-fault divorce in a "standard" Louisiana marriage and that in a "covenant" marriage is
the lengthier waiting period of one year and one-half in a "covenant" marriage. Thus, the two-year
waiting period significantly slows down the process of divorcing when compared to the 180-day
waiting period for divorce in a "standard" marriage. La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103.
47. Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America
(1984).
48. Generally, a minister is understood to be the clergyman in a church of a Protestant
denomination-Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal.
The Louisiana Baptist Convention (Southern Baptist) adopted a resolution on November 17, 1997,
endorsing covenant marriage and encouraging their ministers to" use it as any other tool in
strengthening marriage. The National Southern Baptist Convention in Nevada adopted a similar
resolution in June, 1998, encouraging their members from states other than Louisiana and Arizona
to encourage the introduction and passage of covenant marriage legislation in their states. By
contrast, Dan E. Solomon, Bishop of the United Methodist Church in Louisiana released a statement
on June 27, 1997, essentially describing the legislation as intrusive and redundant (on file with the
author). Other evangelical Protestant denominations such as the Pentecostals and Assemblies of God
have wholeheartedly endorsed covenant marriage.
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priest,' 9 or rabbis" may perform the required pre-marital counseling, just as any
of them may perform the ceremony.5 Likewise, as in the case of performance
of the ceremony,5" the legislation provides a secular alternative to who may
provide the counseling, a marriage counselor." Preventing bad marriages or
identifying potential areas of disagreementtbrough serious pre-maritalcounseling
requires intensive one-on-one attention. Furthermore, the work of preserving
marriages through counseling when difficulties arise necessitates the same time-
consuming personal investment which a minister, priest, or rabbi can perform
well, not only by virtue of the commitment of his time, but also by virtue of his
moral authority. The religious cleric communicates in both types of counseling
sessions the religious view of marriage and the "community's" 4 expectation that
the couple will devote serious effort to preserving their marriage.
Because the legislation "invites" religion back to the public square, the
legislation is careful not to "dictate" the content of the counseling beyond its
basic contours.5" Furthermore, the legislature refused to dictate a fixed amount
49. Priest clearly includes a Catholic and Episcopalian clergyman.
The Catholic Bishops of Louisiana issued a Pastoral Statement on October 29, 1997, recognizing
the commendable concern of the legislature for the permanence and stability of marriage by enacting
the Covenant Marriage Act. Nonetheless, the statement continued:
Because there are elements in this particular Covenant Marriage Act which require those
preparing couples for marriage to offer instruction on divorce contrary to the Church's
teaching, Catholic ministers preparing couples for marriage will concentrate their focus
on the Church's responsibility and teaching. The task to offer guidance with regard to
the specifics of the Covenant Marriage Act will then be left to those who render this
service in the name of the State. It would be inappropriate for those ministering to
couples preparing for marriage in the Catholic Church to confuse or obscure the integrity
of the Church's teaching and discipline by also providing this service, contradictory to
Church teaching and mandated by this state law.
(On file with author).
By contrast, the Episcopal Bishop-Elect Charles Jenkins of Baton Rouge was quoted in the
newspaper on October 30, 1997, as saying the following: "By bringing couples in covenant
marriages back to a fault-based divorce system, with the cynicism and occasional collusion for the
sake of a divorce, 'It goes back to the bad old days regarding divorce and dissolution of a
household,' Jenkins said. 'We've been there; it doesn't work. Those old ideas compromised the
moral character of couples, they compromised the integrity ofjudges, courts and attorneys." Bruce
Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant Marriage, Times-Picayune, Thursday, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al.
50. No rabbi or other official of the Jewish faith has issued a formal statement; however, the
Times-Picayune reports that Jewish leaders had already signaled little support for the new civil
contract. See Nolan, supra note 49, at Al.
51. La. R.S. 9:202(1) (1991). See also La. Civ. Code art. 91 and comments thereto.
52. Id. at (2). A state judge or justice of the peace is permitted to perform the marriage
ceremony.
53. Discussion of who is a marriage counselor under the statute appears in infra text at notes
112-120.
54. The "community" as used here refers not only to the congregation of the church or temple
but also the larger society in which the couple lives, including their neighborhood, social circle, or
city.
55. The basic contours consist of an emphasis on the seriousness of marriage, the intention of
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of time for the pre-marital counseling, the reason being that to do so would be
unnecessarily intrusive. Many religious denominations already have extensive
pre-marital counseling programs in place, such as the Catholic Church's Pre-
Canna, the Prep Course, or the Prepare Inventory. The latter two pre-marital
counseling programs are attracting increased attention, particularly in those
communities which have adopted a "Community Marriage Policy, '56 such as
Modesta, California;' Austin, Texas; and Grand Rapids, Michigan.5" With the
creation of the nascent national organization, Marriage Savers, 9 which promotes
pre-marital counseling, such serious, extensive programs will increasingly be
initiated by religious denominations. Thus, criticism of the pre-marital
counseling component of the legislation as "shallow"60 and lacking in rigorous
content and time specifications fails to recognize that the "omission" was
calculated to avoid serious objections from those issued an invitation to assist in
preserving marriages.
the couple that it be lifelong, and an explanation of the differing grounds for divorce explicated in
the Attorney General's pamphlet entitled "The Covenant Marriage Act" See infra discussion in text
at notes 97-128.
56. Dr. Roger Sider in his article Sider, supra note 32, at 6-7, describes their community
marriage policy:
These figures [divorce rate and percentage of children who grow up without married
parents under the same roof] got the attention of a group of local citizens: a mayor, a
pastor, a social worker, and myself, a psychiatrist. Each of us had become alarmed at the
mounting toll exacted by the erosion of marriage in western Michigan, especially on
children. In fall 1996, we set out to establish a community marriage policy, modeled on
programs enacted in 86 cities across the nation, to give children a better chance of
growing up in stable, two-parent homes.
Most other community marriage agreements rely heavily on churches to raise the bar
for wedlock. Their strategies often include premarital counseling for engaged couples.
That's a vital step, but we're going much further: In Grand Rapids, we are erecting a
large civic tent under which a variety of community leaders-not only clergy but also
political, medical, business, and judicial figures-come together to strengthen mar-
riage....
The policy sets three goals to be achieved within 10 years: reduce the divorce rate by
25 percent, reduced by 25 percent the number of children growing up without the benefit
of married parents in a stable home, and establish thorough preparation for marriage as
a community norm....
Michael McManus, the author of MARRIAGE SAVERS (1995) and the architect of the
community marriage policy concept points out that churches and synagogues are
foundational to the policy's success. Because at least 75 percent of our community's
weddings take place in churches, our clergy and our congregations have both a special
responsibility and a special opportunity to revitalize marriage.
57. Demographics: More Get Marriage Counseling Before Marriage, Wall St. J., February 6,
1996, at BI.
58. See extensive discussion in supra note 54.
59. See supra note 56. Marriage Savers is headed by President, Mike McManus and Director,
Kent Dyer, 8500 Michael's Court, Bethesda, MD 20817.
60. See Carriere, supra note 3, at 1705-10.
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C. Restoration of Protection and Power to the "Innocent" Spouse
Finally, the covenant marriage legislation seeks to restore some protection
and some power to the "innocent" spouse who has kept her promises and desires
to preserve the marriage.61 Unilateral no-fault divorce deprived the "innocent"
spouse who desired a continuation of the marriage of any defense to an action
for divorce by the spouse who "broke up" the family.62 Even Herma Hill Kay,
Dean of the law school at the University of California, Berkeley, who continues
to be an advocate of no-fault divorce law, 3 observed that unilateral no-fault
divorce is "closer to desertion than to mutual separation."" By lengthening the
period of time for a no-fault divorce by one and one-half years, the covenant
61. Divorce was also known to have had a greater negative economic effect on women
than on men, one reason being that no-fault divorce took away the bargaining power that
the innocent spouse, usually the wife, had under the fault system to agree to divorce only
in exchange for adequate alimony, child support, and property .... By 1997 those who
were frustrated in their attempt to better the economic situation of divorced women and
those who were newly alarmed over the effect of divorce on children joined forces with
those who objected to easy divorce on religious or moral grounds. They united in an
effort to try a different approach.
Samuel, supra note 4.
Nonetheless, some commentators portray this bargaining power as the equivalent of blackmail:
"A divorce law restricted to fault does harm by preserving legal unions that are emotionally
nonviable, creating incentives for evasion and blackmail." Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New
Directions in Divorce Reform, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 6, 36 (1990). But even Dean Kay
adds, "A no-fault, no-responsibility divorce law does harm by favoring the economically independent
party over the dependent party, creating incentives to distort the law of property in search of just
solutions. A framework for a nonpunitive, non-sexist, and nonpaternalistic system of marriage
dissolution built on sharing principles can minimize, if not entirely eliminate, the financial harm done
by divorce." Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 37 for a description of the feminists' opposition
to covenant marriage.
See also Bartlett, supra note 7, at 834-43, in which the author who admits internal conflict as both
a traditionalist and a feminist concludes that women and children may have the most to lose from
divorce reform. Thereafter, she attempts to make the case principally for women, not children, which
suggests her feminist side prevailed.
62. Even Henna Hill Kay acknowledges as much in her article, Kay, supra note 61:
The fault doctrine may have served to lend emotional vindication to the rejected spouse,
as well as a measure of financial protection and status as the preferred custodian of
children. If so, greater justification may be required in those cases for eliminating that
doctrine from the related core areas of support, property distribution, and child
custody .... But if fault is withdrawn, the party formerly able to invoke that doctrine
may be left in a vulnerable position both when negotiating a dissolution agreement and
when litigating the matter in court.
Id. at8.
For an example of the result of no-fault divorce on the spouse who desires to preserve the
marriage, see Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?, supra note 34.
See Ellman & Lohr, supra note IS for a different view.
63. See Kay, supra note 61.
64. Kay, supra note 61, at 8.
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marriage legislation empowers the "innocent" spouse by bestowing upon her the
exclusive right to a divorce for a two-year period.6S
The "innocent" spouse's bargaining power66 can be exercised to insist upon
serious counseling in an effort to preserve the marriage, or barring counseling's
success, to demand financial advantages for herself 7 or for her children.6"
Since the right to receive an interim allowance (alimony pendente lite69) exists
at least until divorce70 and an interim allowance is ordinarily a larger sum than
final spousal support,7' the "ihnocent" spouse who receives such an allowance
enhances her already considerable bargaining power during the lengthy two-year
period. In addition to the interim allowance, the "innocent" spouse may also
have a claim for damages should the other spouse refuse to comply with his
obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the marriage." The other
spouse who, by his own fault, has "broken up" the family unit must wait two
years to seek his own divorce. While he waits, he will be paying a significantly
higher sum in spousal support than he will pay after the divorce. He also may
be obligated to pay damages for breach of his contract to seek counseling. In
65. The grounds for immediate divorce that the "innocent" spouse may have against the other
spouse include adultery, abandonment for one year, commission of a felony with a sentence to
imprisonment at hard labor or death, or physical or sexual abuse of a spouse or a child of the parties.
In addition, she may seek a legal separation for cruel treatment or habitual intemperance and one year
or one year and six months later obtain a divorce. See infra discussion in text at notes 280-417.
66. The phenomena is described by Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kombauserin, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law." The Case of Dh'orce, 88 Yale L J. 950 (1979). See also Samuel, supra note
4; Kay, supra note 61, at 8.
67. Such as a greater proportion of the community property (but without violating the formula
for lesion, see La. Civ. Code art. 814) or a larger sum in final spousal support than she would be
entitled to under La. Civ. Code arts. 111-116.
68. This is particularly true when the "innocenf' spouse is not employed or cams less than the
other spouse and the children are approaching majority, the time when children are the most
expensive. In Louisiana the obligation to pay support for children 18 years or older is governed by
the provisions of La. Civ. Code art. 229. Unlike child support for minor children, support for major
children does not include a sum for education (i.e. college education). Furthermore, support is
limited under Article 229 to food, clothing and shelter but only if the claimant is unable to support
himself. Thus, the "innocent" spouse could exercise her bargaining power to entice the other spouse
to agree to support the children during college (i.e. creation of a trust) in exchange for her initiation
of divorce proceedings for legitimate grounds before the two year period elapses.
Furthermore, Cynthia Samuel in her article, Samuel, supra note 4, suggests that Louisiana Civil
Code article 1976 be amended to remove the prohibition against one's future succession as the object
of a contract. If the prohibition is removed, the "innocenf' spouse may also exercise her bargaining
power to exact a contract to provide for the children at the other spouse's death. See also Comment,
supra note 6.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 111 (repealed Jan. 1, 1998).
70. La. Civ. Code art. 113. See infra discussion in text at notes 444-446. This interim
allowance may be claimed from the moment that the spouses begin living separate and apart before
any divorce or separation action is instituted. See La. R.S. 9:291 (1991).
71. La. Civ. Code arts. 111, 112. Compare the criteria ofan interim allowance and that of final
periodic support.
72. See infra discussion in text at notes 182-279.
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addition if he wants to remarry, he will be the especially vulnerable target of this
shift in divorce law policy.7" Even one critic74 of the covenant marriage
legislation acknowledges these advantages, but only in a footnote:
The delay offers two possible advantages to divorcing spouses: First,
it permits an economically weaker spouse more time to make financial
adjustments by prolonging the support obligation of marriage: and
second, it may facilitate reconciliation if the partners marital difficulties
are not irremediable.75
Precisely.
Both ofthese "advantages"outweigh critics' concem for increasing acrimony
in divorce,76 which has never been eliminated in Louisiana!' and now takes
the truly venal form of allegations of sexual abuse of a child in a custody
dispute.7" Isn't it preferable for one spouse to accuse the other of abandonment
for one year, or even of adultery, than of sexually abusing their child, which
73. A motivation for no-fault divorce, Herma Hill Kay explained, was to remove punishment
from the marital dissolution equation: "While the primary objective of the modem American no-fault
divorce reform movement was to change the grounds for divorce, related reforms were proposed as
well in the laws governing other core issues of family dissolution. These proposals were initially
limited to an effort to remove the punitive function formerly performed by the fault doctrine from
such questions as alimony, property distribution, and child custody." Kay, supra note 61, at 8.
Nonetheless, Dean Kay in the next paragraph admits that fault "may have served to lend emotional
vindication to the rejected spouse .. " Id. At the end of her article, however, she continues to
support a non-punitive system of marriage dissolution. Id. at 36.
An important function of law, i.e. tort and contract, is to punish. It seems particularly appropriate
to punish a spouse for breaching his promise which was made solemnly and which is of such
importance to third parties, principally his children but also to society at large.
74. See ElIman & Lohr, supra note 18, who interpret the circumstances differently.
75. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1720 n.l 18. See Samuel, supra note 4.
76. This reducing acrimony in divorce has been the mantra of no-fault divorce advocates since
the early 1970's. For example, Herma Hill Kay's observation in Kay, supra note 61, at 8: "It
follows that once the marriage is no longer viable, neither its legal existence nor its related legal
incidents should become weapons used to obtain revenge for the breakdown or to extort a favorable
settlement."
77. Even in "standard" marriages, adultery and conviction of a felony remain as grounds for
divorce. La. Civ. Code art. 103. Furthermore, "fault" of the claimant of final spousal support at
divorce has always been and remains an absolute bar to its receipt (La. Civ. Code art. I I) and the
conduct of a parent, including his moralfitness, has been and remains relevant to child custody
determinations. La. Civ. Code art. 134(6). Other examples of issues to be litigated that explore
"fault" in divorce proceedings include Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act, La. R.S. 9:361-
366 (1998). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2433 (fault is relevant for entitlement to the marital portion
at death).
"Even without covenant marriage fault is still a factor in determining an award of post-divorce
spousal support (i.e., post-divorce alimony), thus fault is already litigated in connection with
support." Samuel, supra note 4.
78. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:364 (Supp. 1998) in essence makes allegations of sexual abuse
of a child the "atomic bomb" of divorce proceedings. If such sexual abuse can be proved, then the
abuser's custody and visitation rights are terminated.
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necessitates a physician's intimate examination of the child? Acrimony on
account of divorce can never be eliminated unless both parties are in agreement
that their relationship is "dead," because otherwise one spouse has been guilty
of a violation of trust or a loss of romantic interest in the context of the most
intimate of all human relationships. Furthermore, even if the two spouses agree
that their relationship is "dead," what about the interest of the children, most of
whom desire that their parents remain together, if their interest conflicts with the
desires of the two parents?
Restoration of "moral discourse" to divorce law79 troubles most critics of
the covenant marriage law more than any other aspect of the legislation."0 The
"moral discourse" consists of society's collective condemnation of certain,
selected conduct within the marital relationship. Returning to objective moral
judgments about a spouse's conduct threatens the discredited mantra of
libertarians and others that "you can't legislate morals."'" Of course, "you"
79. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation ofAmerican Family Law, 83
Mich. L Rev. 1803 (1985), cited by Carriere, supra note 3, at 1723 n.137.
Despite acknowledging that Schneider and Mary Ann Glendon have thoughtful objections to no-
fault divorce, Ellman & Lohr, supra note 18, at 734, conclude that:
[o]ne can be sympathetic to many of theirpoints and still supportno-fault divorce, for any
number of reasons. Unfortunately, however, some of Schneider's and Glendon's
observations have been made with phrases easily converted into slogans by others with
less nuanced views. A particularly misleading example is the suggestion that no-fault
divorce means "no-responsibility" divorce.
Such a suggestion is attributed to Galston, supra note 26, at 18.
80. See, eg., Carriere, supra note 3, at 1723:
However, relatively few actions within the family are so violative of social norms that
the relational context makes no difference to the question of blameworthiness. Western
literature is replete with evidence for the proposition that even one party's adultery, while
a clear breach of the marital obligation and never a good idea, can occur in a context in
which culpability for the breach must be shared by the spouses. (see sources in footnote
140) Compare David Gelemter, Adultery Then and Now, The Weekly Standard 25-28
(Nov. 30-Dec. 7, 1998).
See also Ellman & Lohr, supra note 18. Professor ElIman is particularly vehement about the
restoration of fault to divorce proceedings for any purpose. See, eg., Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided
Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law
Institute, II Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fain. 216 (1997) (Professor ElIman is the chief reporter of the ALl
project on Principles of Family Dissolution); Ira Mark Ellan, The Place of Fault in a Modem
Divorce Law, 28 Ariz. St. LJ. 773 (1996). His strong aversion to fault explains why the American
Law Institute's project, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, does not include fault as a
relevant factor for purposes of marital property distribution or compensation payments at divorce.
Even social commentators who understand the destructiveness of divorce are in some cases reluctant
to suggest a return to fault-based grounds for divorce. See Maggie Gallagher, Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, End No-Fault Divorce?, First Things, Aug.-Sept., 1997, at 24.
81. Or, "[a] good marriage cannot be legislated, because '[a]lmost all couples who marry
believe their love is forever and their commitment is for a lifetime. But things sometimes change
and people sometimes change. And sometimes, no amount of work or commitment will make a
marriage successful."' In Note, supra note 33, at 281 (quoting in note 120 from Difficult Divorces
May Add to Misery (Baton Rouge, La.), June 13, 1997, 10 B (editorial)).
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can. Congress and legislatures do it every day. Only when the morals to be
legislated have the potential of impeding the affected person's "liberty""2 to
leave his family when he so chooses do we hear objections. Interestingly, the
same objection is never made if the legislation concerns elements of contract
law 3 -for example, assigning blame for the breach of contract,"' requiring all
contracts to be performed in "good faith," 5 and assessing damages for breach
of contract based upon whether the party breached the contract in good faiths
or bad faith.s7 Principles of contract and tort law involve moral judgments
which most often apply in the context of a relationship between strangers. Why
hesitate to make a moral judgment with spouses who have been married for
thirty years and have three children?
The return to broader notions of objective fault in divorce and "slowing
down" the divorcing process in the covenant marriage legislation represent, as
a general trend, the first time in at least two hundred years in any Western
country that divorce law has made divorce more difficult rather than easier.88
Therein lies the historical and cultural significance of the covenant marriage
legislation and explains its national and international notoriety. Therein lies the
dual threat to notions of "libertinism" disguised in language of "liberty" and to
notions of necessary tolerance of pluralistic behavior, what used to be considered
anti-social behavior.8 9 Therein lies the perceived threat to many divorce
lawyers who recognize that covenant marriage could herald the return to the not
so good, "good, old days." In many cases, the "good, old days" meant difficult
work gathering evidence of fault in preparation for a trial that might not result
in the divorce the client desired,9° a reduced profit margin per case because
Compare the language used in the newspaper editorial to that of Max L. Stackhouse, Covenant &
Commitments: Faith, Family, and Economic Life 159 (1997): "Through covenant they become
interlocked structures by which our human propensities to egoism, selfishness, short-sightedness, and
carelessness are constrained and the possibilities of altruism, generosity, long-range vision, and
engagement are evoked."
82. "[Family standardizing reform [traditional family anchored by husband and wife] threatens
the very diversity and notions of individual freedom on which more robust notions of the community
and family depend." Bartlett, supra note 7, at 818 (emphasis added).
83. Even more pronounced are the moral judgments made in the context of tort law. La. Civ.
Code art. 2315.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 2013.
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 1996.
87. La. Civ. Code art. 1997. See also comment (b) for a definition of bad faith that requires
proof of intention and maliciousness.
88. See generally Glendon, Abortion and Divorce, supra note 25, at 64-81; Witte, supra note
1; Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath,
56 U. Cinn. L Rev. 1 (1987).
89. William Bennett, Death of Outrage: Bill Clinton and the Assault on American Ideals
(1998); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization of Society: From Victorian Virtues to Modem
Values (1995)'
90. Presently, to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code article 102
requires only the filing of pleading forms that can be stored on a computer disk and names
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clients simply could not pay the costs of extensive litigation,9' and, potentially,
diminished professional stature because of the daily pursuit of the salacious.
Despite expressed concern about the return to a practice of widespread perjury
by covenant spouses who want a divorce,92 there was never proof of such a
widespread practice in Louisiana.93 Of course, as to perjury the judiciary and
the attorneys bear some responsibility." Even though perjury should surely be
condemned, the fraud upon the court did at least require cooperation of both
spouses and precluded the current practice of legalized desertion by one spouse.
Permitting one spouse to effectively destroy a family unit of five persons9
without good reason and without significant consequences has had a corrosive
effect on our society. As evidence mounts of the social destruction in the wake
of surging divorce rates and now surging cohabitation rates, responsible policy
makers can no longer simply wring their hands in despair and helplessness.
Action is required. Covenant marriage legislation, hopefully, is only the
beginning of the resurgence of interest in and protection of the institution of
marriage? -- the foundation upon which the "family" is built.
substituted. One hundred and eighty days later, the attorney files another form that also may be
stored on a computer disk and names substituted. There need be no hearing to prepare for (La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3956) and there is but one defense-reconciliation which requires proof of an intention
to resume the life in common. La. Civ. Code art. 104.
91. Compare the time and effort of the attorney in the preparation of the forms required for a
divorce under Louisiana Civil Code article 102 and that required to prove a case of adultery at a trial.
The attorney's time is ordinarily expensive, but his client who is now living separate and apart from
the other spouse has almost double the expenses he had before the separation and ultimately, "you
can't get blood out of a turnip." See also Alan J. Hawkins, Perspectives on Covenant Marriage, 12
The Family in America 1, 4 (Nov. 1998).
But see Samuel, supra note 4: "Covenant marriage will not add much to the expense of divorce
in Louisiana. Even without covenant marriage fault is still a factor in determining an award of post-
divorce spousal support (i.e., post-divorce alimony), thus fault is already litigated in connection with
support."
92. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1743-44. The possibility of perjury as to the type of marriage
contracted can be solved relatively easily by the requirement that a copy of the marriage certificate
be attached to the petition for separation or divorce.
J. Herbie DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line: The Popular and Legal Culture of Divorce in
Twentieth-Century America (1997).
93. New York is always cited as the example of rampant perjury in divorce cases because New
York was and continues to be one of the states with the strictest divorce laws in the country.
94. See Samuel, supra note 4: "Some of these problems festered in part due to the lenient
attitude of lawyers and judges toward divorce at a time when the legislation was strict as to all
couples. But when a couple has voluntarily chosen a strict regime of divorce after premarital
counseling on the subject, there is no justification for the lawyer or judge to manipulate or allow
manipulation of the law or evidence to effect a divorce for such a couple... ." The "problem" of
perjured testimony is one that addresses itself to the lawyers and the judges.
95. See Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?, supra note 34.
96. However, not for the reasons Katharine Bartlett describes in her article, Bartlett, supra note
7, at 816:
This Lecture [Brigitte V. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture on the Family] is about
marriage. That does not mean that I believe marriage is the only appropriate vehicle for
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IH. FIRST DISTINGUISHING FEATURE: MANDATORY PRE-MARITAL
COUNSELING
Opponents of divorce law reform often counter legislative attempts to make
divorce more difficult by urging more onerous requirements for marriage.
Proponents of strengthening marriage typically offer pre-marital counseling as an
educational9 obstacle to a hasty, precipitous decision to marry. The most
popular bill to strengthen marriage introduced by Michigan state representative
Jesse Dahlman offered the incentive of a reduction in price for a marriage license
to a couple who would submit to pre-marital counseling.9" During the 1998
session, the Florida Legislature passed an act that provides the same sort of
incentive as Representative Dalman's bill to submit to pre-marital counseling.99
For covenant couples, pre-marital counseling is mandatory.
raising children or nurturing adults; my view is, rather, that marriage is worth strengthen-
ing because its popularity and its associations with familial responsibility and commitment
to others make it too beneficial a resource to abandon.
Obviously, such a view is reflective of what Professor Bartlett describes at the beginning of her
article: "The dissonance between my attachment to tradition and my feminism creates the perspective
from which I examine public debates about family and values." Id. at 811.
See Midge Decter, The Madness of the American Family, Pol'y Rev. 33 (Sept., Oct. 1998) ("In
a recent talk, author and social critic Midge Decter asked why the wealthiest and healthiest country
on earth has such nutty ideas about the family").
97. Educational options are always favored by the same persons who strenuously oppose any
changes in the law which permit autonomy of the individual (license). As a consequence "education"
about virtually everything has grown from a "cottage" to a "nationalized" industry. At the same time
the public wrings its hands because primary and secondary education in this country have failed in
its responsibility to teach our children basic skills.
98. Michigan House Bill No. 5217, 89th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); S. File No. 2935,
89th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). The most controversial of her bills was the bill to repeal
unilateral no-fault divorce. It was the centerpiece of her legislative package and the first legislative
initiative to receive national attention.
Neither measure passed the Michigan legislature and by virtue of term limits Representative
Dahlman, a truly courageous female legislator, no longer may continue her quest to end the tragic
consequences of no-fault divorce for Michigan citizens.
99. Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act, ch. 98-403 (Fla. H.B. No. 1019) (2d Reg. Sess.
1998) (eff. Jan. 1, 1999). Pre-marital counseling is encouraged for engaged couples by the incentive
of a $32.50 reduction in the cost of a marriage license, which may not prove to be a strong enough
incentive.
In addition another provision of the same legislation requires that a course in life management
skills (1/2 credit), which would include among the other components marriage and relationship skill-
based education, be taught to high school students as a graduation requirement. Fla. Stat ch. 232.6
(eft. Jan. 1, 1999). Unfortunately, the bill does not require that "marriage" and its benefits be
extolled, and the legitimate fear based upon past experience is that any curriculum added to the high
schools in Florida will treat all "relationships" as of equal value. Thus, conflict resolution skills
taught as a part of this curriculum, much like the PARTNERS program developed by the American
Bar Association, will relate to all types of relationships, rather than emphasize the use of those skills
to prolong and strengthen a couple's marriage.
Another component of the Act is the creation of a Family Law Handbook to be prepared by the
Family Law Section of the Florida Bar Association which would detail the rights and obligations of
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Mandatory pre-marital counseling insures not only that an "educational"
obstacle to hasty marriage is erected, but also that two documents be executed
and signed by the couple, the counselor, and a notary attesting to the fact that the
counseling did occur. A covenant marriage, consistent with the legal understand-
ing of covenant at common law,"° represents the rough equivalent of an
agreement that requires greater formality and limits defenses to the agreement
that may be raised by the signatories.'' Covenant: religious "overtones,"' 2
of course.'0 3 In his book, Covenant & Commitment, Max L. Stackhouse,
opines:
The sociotheological idea of covenant is so rich with ethical content that
it gives moral meaning to all it touches.'0 4  ... [A] covenant shifts
the terms of... relationships. It is not cut casually, for it entails not
only celebration and sacrifice but also the incorporation of new shared
duties and rights that nourish life with other meanings, and thus a sense
that these duties and rights are based on an enduring law and purpose
as established by a higher authority.0 5
Covenant marriage legislation responds to the opponents of divorce law reform
by using mandatory pre-marital counseling and the executionof documents in the
presence of a notary "to make marriage more difficult" and the commitment
more serious.
A. Who Is a Counselor?
Just as they may perform the marriage ceremony, '" a minister,'07
spouses, including property law and divorce law, and be available in the Clerk of Court's office. Fla.
Stat. ch. 741.0306 (eff. Jan. 1, 1999).
100. See Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract, & Covenant, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1573 (1994).
See also Margaret F. Brinig, From Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the
Family (Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming, 2000).
101. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) defines covenant as "[an agreement, convention,
or promise of two or more parties, by deed, in writing, signed, sealed, and delivered, by which either
of the parties pledges himself to the other that something is either done or shall be done, or stipulates
for the truth of certain facts .. "
102. See Comment, supra note 3.
103. See Witte, supra note 1.
104. Stackhouse, supra note 81, at 140.
105. Id. at 142.
106. See La. R.S. 9:202 (1991 and Supp. 1998).
107. Ordinarily, the term minister is used to refer to the leader of an individual Protestant
church-for example, a Baptist minister.
The Southern Bapistdenomination adopted resolutions at both their state convention in November,
1997, and at their national convention in June, 1998, endorsing covenant marriage legislation in
Louisiana and legislative attempts to adopt similar legislation in other states.
The Methodist Bishop for the region that includes Louisiana issued a statement labeling covenant
marriage legislation "unnecessary," "confusing," and "intrusive." Press release from the Louisiana
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priest,'0 rabbi,'0 9 or other clergyman of a religious sect may perform the pre-
marital counseling required for a covenant marriage. In matters of marriage in
the United States," 0 religious figures have traditionally been authorized by the
state to perform marriages which are entitled to recognition under secular law.
There has never been a clear separation between church and state in matters of
celebration of marriage."' Yet, both for performance of the ceremony or for
pre-marital counseling prior to a covenant marriage, the Louisiana legislation
offers a secular alternative." 2  The section of the Revised Statutes that
Area United Methodist Church (June 27, 1997) (on file with author). See Church Leaders Debate
"Covenant Marriage," Interpreter 15 (May-June 1998), apublication of the United Methodist Church.
Methodists who are not members of the National United Methodist Church are celebrating and
encouraging covenant marriages.
Evangelical Protestant denominations, such as Assemblies of God and Pentecostals, have likewise
embraced the concept of covenant marriage, and some individual churches require a covenant
marriage license for the marriage to be celebrated in their sanctuary or chapel. The requirement
reflects their belief that the covenant marriage more nearly represents their religious view of
marriage. The author of the student comment, Comment, supra note 3, at 435 n.69, labels as bias
such a morally consistent position.
108. The category of priest would include a priest in the Catholic Church. However, the
Catholic Bishops of Louisiana issued a pastoral statement in October, 29, 1997, which commended
the concern of the legislature for strong and stable marriages but refused to permit their priests to
offer instruction on divorce, as the Act requires, contrary to the Church's teaching (on file with the
author). See Nolan, supra note 49.
Priest may also include a priest in the Episcopal Church. Unlike the Catholic Bishops, Bishop
Charles Jenkins in a statement issued in October, 1997, surprisingly objects to covenant marriage
because:
By bringing couples in covenant marriages back to a fault-based divorce system, with its
cynicism and occasional collusion for the sake of a divorce, "It goes back to the bad old
days regarding divorce and dissolution of a household:' [Bishop] Jenkins said. We've
been there; it doesn't work. Those old ideas compromised the moral character of couples,
they compromised the integrity of judges, courts and attorneys.
Id.
109. Although no official statement has ever been issued by a Jewish rabbi, the Times-Picayune
reported that Jewish leaders already had signaled little support for the new civil contract, but no
official statement was ever issued or reported identifying the Jewish leaders. Id.
110. European practice is quite different and requires a civil ceremony before a civil magistrate
for state recognition; a religious ceremony is purely optional. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Family
Law in Louisiana 1-2 (2d ed. 1998). See also Witte, supra note 1; Glendon, Abortion and Divorce,
supra note 25.
Il. See Note, supra note 25, at 2504 n.306:
If opponents of the law argued in court that covenant marriage violates the Establishment
Clause, the argument would not likely go far as there is evidence that many churches
reject covenant marriage ... . The Court [in Harris v. McRae] rejected this argument
[violation of separation of church and state], holding that "it does not follow that a statute
violates the Establishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions."'
The student author also concluded that covenant marriage laws did not violate the due process or
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
112. La. R.S. 9:273(AX2)(a) (Supp. 1998) ("or a (secular] marriage counselor"); La. R.S.
9:202(2), 203 (1991 and Supp. 1998) (celebrant may be a judge or justice of the peace).
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describes the secular alternative to a clergyman uses the term marriage
counselor."' The term is not defined in the covenant marriage legislation, nor
elsewhere in the Revised Statutes where the term is used-for example, as a
mediator in child custody disputes."" Even though the jurisprudence has yet
to define marriage counselor,"5 the Louisiana statutes governing the licensing
of professional counselors provide insight as to the qualifications for counselor.
A "licensed professional counselor" renders "service to the public in the mental
health counseling area.""' 6 Mental health counseling encompasses "assisting
an individual or group, through the counseling relationship, to develop an
understanding of personal problems, to define goals, and to plan
actions... ,'I" To be licensed as a professional counselor requires a minimum
of three thousand hours of supervised experience during "a minimum of two
years of post-master's degree experience in professional mental health counsel-
ing"; passage of a written, and possibly an oral, examination; a graduate degree
"the substance of which is professional mental health counseling in con-
tent. . . ."g As Professor Carriere accurately observes in her article in the
Tulane Law Review, "the state places no restrictions on who may qualify to act
as a 'marriage counselor'; at present, Louisiana does not require one to have a
license to assume that title."'' 9 In the footnote, she reports that the Louisiana
Association for Marriage and Family Therapy "plans to introduce licensing
legislation in the 1999 legislative session." 1 20
B. Content of the Counseling
The covenant marriage legislation imposes only minimal requirements for
the content of the pre-marital counseling which include a discussion of: (1) the
The American Civil Liberties Union had argued at the hearing before the House Committee on
Civil Law and Procedure that the content of the covenant marriage legislation represented an
unconstitutional violation of "the separation of church and state." It is difficult to understand such
an argument when the legislation clearly provides a secular alternative. By the time of the hearing
on the bill in the Senate Committee on Judiciary A, the failure to separate church and state argument
was only a minor part of the myriad objections of the ACLU to the bill. See supra discussion in
notes 110-111.
113. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998).
114. La. R.S. 9:334(AXI)(b) (Supp. 1998).
115. There have been no reported appellate court cases interpreting the term, marriage
counselor, in the statute that imposes qualifications for mediators. However, the statute qualifies
marriage or family counselor with the adjectives licensed or cenifed. Id.
116. La. R.S. 37:1102 (1988 and Supp. 1998).
117. La. R.S. 37:1103(4)(a) (1988).
118. La. R.S. 37:1107 (1988 and Supp. 1998). The specific requirements, particularly
educational, are detailed and fairly onerous. In addition to the eight required areas of study of at
least one semester, id. at(A)(8)(b), one of the two areas encouraged for inclusion in graduate training
is "marriage and family studies." Id. at (A)X8)(c).
119. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1708.
120. Id. at na1.
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seriousness of marriage; (2) the intention of the couple that their marriage be
lifelong; (3) the agreement of the couple that they will "seek marital counseling
in times of marital difficulties"; and (4) the limited grounds for divorce in a
covenant marriage [when compared to a "standard" marriage as explained in
"The Covenant Marriage Act."]." The legislature imposed minimal require-
ments purposefully, as has already been explained,"' because the object was
to invite religion back into the public square to lend its assistance to preserving
marriages, not to dictate the manner in which religion had to assist.
The first three elements of content required in the pre-marital counseling
appear in the declaration of intent signed by the parties.' Explaining that in
a covenant marriage the grounds for divorce are limited was a requirement added
by amendment in the Senate Committee on Judiciary A. It was the understand-
ing at the time the amendment was offered and passed that the explanation of the
law of divorce was to be in a pamphlet prepared by the Attorney General,'24
patterned after a similar pamphlet explaining community property law also
distributed to applicants for marriage licenses.125  The senators knew that
virtually all of the counselors utilized by prospective covenant couples would be
religious and thus not trained in the law.' 26 Suggestions that "a person trained
in the law or... schooled in the intricacies of the law governing marriage and
divorce should explain the differences... ."127 was never seriously entertained
by any legislator. If such a requirement were imposed for covenant marriage,
then someone trained in the law would have to explain an apartment lease, a
waiver form signed in a doctor's office, and analogously, the information
contained in the pamphlet concerning community property law.
Until the covenant marriage legislation required the distribution of the
pamphlet, "The Covenant Marriage Act," nothing explained the Louisiana law
of divorce to applicants for marriage licenses. No applicant was informed that
either spouse could end a thirty-year marriage by filing a petition and living
separate and apart from the other for one hundred eighty days."2 Now, all of
121. La. K.S. 9:273(A)(2Xa) (Supp. 1998).
122. See supra discussion in text at note 55.
123. See La. P.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998).
124. See 1997 La. Acts No. 1380, § 5.
125. See La. LS. 9:237 (1991).
126. - Nonetheless, the requirement that the counselor explain the grounds for divorce prevented
the priests in the Catholic Church in Louisiana from fully participating in a movement designed to
strengthen marriage. The tragedy is that by comparison to the "standard" marriage in Louisiana, a
covenant marriage more closely conforms to the Catholic Church's understanding of Christian
marriage. At a time when the Church's annulment practices are under attack Catholics would have
benefitted by embracing covenant marriage and promoting it for its faithful. See Shelia K, Kennedy,
Shattered Faith (1997) (criticizing the Church's annulment practices).
127. Comment, supra note 3, at 435. See also similar criticism in Carriere, supra note 3, at
1708-10.
128. See La. Civ. Code art. 102. See Florida legislation creating a Family Law Handbook to
be distributed in every Clerk of Court's office in Florida.
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a sudden, critics express concern that couples who wish to commit to a stronger
form of marriage, and only those couples, must be fully informed by one trained
in the law about grounds for divorce. The Florida legislature enacted legislation
in 1998 that requires an applicant for a marriage license receive a pamphlet
prepared by the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar Association explaining
the Florida law of divorce. 29 The covenant marriage law accomplished this
objective for the state of Louisiana without separate legislation.
C. Necessary Documents for Covenant Marriage
Two documents available in the local Clerk of Court's office must be
presented to the Clerk:30 (1) Declaration of Intent by the couple;'.' (2) an
affidavit by the couple and the counselor accompanied by the notary's signa-
ture.'32 As a general matter, the Declaration of Intent signed by the wife and
the husband constitutes a special contract ("covenant")between them, not merely
a declaration of the couple's aspirations.' However, in practice and in its
expression, the clause of the Declaration that states the intention of the couple
that their marriage be lifelong' is admittedly aspirational because more
specific legislation permits grounds for termination of the marriage other than
death.' 3  Nonetheless, the declaration signed by the couple containing their
129. See Florida legislation creating a Family Law Handbook to be distributed in every Clerk
of Court's office in Florida.
130. Two documents are required whether the couple is to be married for the first time or is
already married and is converting to a "covenant" marriage; however, the Declaration of Intent signed
by a couple not yet married (La. R.S. 9:273(AX1) (Supp. 1998)) and the Declaration signed by an
already-married couple (La. R.S. 9:275(C)(IXa) (Supp. 1998)) differ.
131. See La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998).
132. See La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2Xa), (b); 273(B) (Supp. 1998) (two documents).
133. But see Carriere, supra note 3, at 1712:
A more likely intent on the part of the legislature was to provide a statement of the
aspirations of the parties to a covenant marriage. The commitment to seek marital
counseling occurs in the declaration of intent, in the midst of other statements couched
as agreements and promises, but conveying aspirations, rather than constituting binding
contracts.
Two other authors recognized the obligation as legal but assumed that the obligation was a
prerequisite to filing for divorce. See Comment, supra note 3, at 436-38. See also Samuel, supra
note 4, at n.20: "Treatment of the counseling agreement as aspirational rather than as a requirement
would solve this problem [danger of counseling in physical abuse cases), but La. R.S. 9:307A
appears to make counseling a requirement before the judgment of divorce can be obtained." See
infra discussion of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:307A in text at notes 183-197.
134. See La. IS. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998): "We do solemnly declare that marriage is a
covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long
as they both may live."
135. See La. R.S. 9:307(A) (Supp. 1998). See infra discussion in text at notes 312-320




expressed intent to achieve the ideal of lifelong marriage" communicates a
powerful message which should not be under-estimated.
37
By contrast, the agreement that if difficulties arise during the marriage, the
couple will "take all reasonable efforts to preserve [their] marriage, including
marital counseling,"'13 constitutes a contractual obligation."'S Permitting such
an agreement departs from the general principle that spouses' personal
obligations during marriage are matters of public order from which they may not
derogate by contract.4 The legislature recognized that public order demanded
this exception as a means to legally compel spouses who agree 4 to take
reasonable steps to preserve their marriage.
D. Grounds for Annulment of Covenant Marriage
A spouse may annul a covenant marriage for the same reasons as a spouse
in a "standard" marriage:" a legal impediment, 4 1 no marriage ceremo-
136. See discussion in text at notes 2-16 concerning the benefits of lifelong marriage not only
for the children but also for the two spouses. For the best summary of the evidence, see Stanton,
supra note 9.
137. The aspirational goal of lifelong marriage in the Declaration deliberately signed and
solemnized by the couple reflects the role of law in educating and persuading the public. James
Boyd White asserts that "law is most usefully seen not... as a system of rules, but as a branch of
rhetoric ... as the central art by which community and culture are established, maintained and
transformed." James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 684 (1985). Mary Ann Glendon expresses the same view
and draws upon her knowledge as a comparativist: "The rhetorical method of law making appears
not only in the great continental codifications, but also, here and there, in all sorts of contemporary
European legislation. It is most especially evident in continental family law." Glendon, Abortion
and Divorce, supra note 25, at 7.
138. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 1906. See infra discussion of the consequences of its recognition as a
contractual obligation in the text at notes 182-201. See also a similar discussion in Carricre, supra
note 3, at 1711-12, wherein the author assumes in her discussion that the agreement might be a
contract and what remedies would be available. Her conclusion is that the remedies may not be
meaningful "for achieving the stated goal of the legislation." Id. at 1712..
140. See La. Civ. Code art. 98 cmt. (e). See also such representative cases as Holliday v.
Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 334 So. 2d 436, rev'd in part on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.), and cert. denied, 429
U.S. 961, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
141. Legal compulsion does not necessarily mean specific performance, but legal compulsion
does mean that there are consequences for the spouse who having made the promise fails to perform
it. See infra discussion in text at notes 194-201.
142. See La. R.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998): "A covenant marriage shall be governed by all of the
provisions of Chapters 1 through 4 of Title IV of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code and the
provisions of Code Title IV of Code Book I of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950."
Chapters I and 2 of Title IV of Book I concern prerequisites for contracting a valid marriage and
grounds for nullity of marriage.
143. La. K.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 88 (existing marriage), 89 (same
sex), and 90 (related within the prohibited degrees).
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ny, 144 or consent not freely given by a spouse. 41 In the former two instanc-
es, the law declares the marriage absolutely null 146 and in the latter instance,
relatively null. 47 Nonetheless, there is a potential ground for annulment of a
covenant marriage that may exist which does not exist explicitly for a spouse
who enters a "standard" marriage: 14 fraud. 49
A "covenant" marriage contains mixed elements of both status and contract.
Whether vices of consent which are available to annul an ordinary contract may
be proved to annul a covenant marriage depends upon whether the reference in
the legislation to annulment in "standard" marriages means those grounds for
annulment are exclusive. Section 274 provides that a covenant marriage "shall
be governed by all of the provisions of Chapters 1 through 4 of Title IV of Book
I... ."5' Among the chapters that shall govern a covenant marriage are
Chapters 1 and 2, which contain the articles on entry into marriage and nullity
of marriage.' However, Section 274 does not provide that a covenant
marriage shall only be governed by those chapters. As a consequence, while
conceding that all of the articles that govern entry into marriage and nullity in
"standard" marriages also apply to "covenant" marriages, an argument can be
made that other articles that apply directly to annulment of ordinary contracts
also apply.
Unlike a "standard" marriage, the engaged couple 52 who contract a
covenant marriage sign a declaration that includes two relevant statements. First,
prospective spouses 153 attest to signing the statement that, "[w]ith full knowl-
edge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare our marriage will
be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages."'' 4  To assure full
knowledge of the commitment the couple makes, the covenant marriage
legislation requires that they be counseled before the execution of the Declaration
and that the couple read the "Covenant Marriage Act," the pamphlet prepared by
the Attorney General.'55 In fact in the Declaration the signatories attest to
144. La. R.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 91 (description of marriage
ceremony requirements), 92 (no marriage by procuration).
145. La. R.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998). See also La. Civ. Code art. 93 (consent is not freely given
if the result of duress or if given by a person incapable of discernment).
146. See La. Civ. Code art. 94.
147. See La. Civ. Code art. 95.
148. See infra discussion in text at notes 174-181.
149. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1953-1958. Compare Carriere, supra note 3, at 1729-30.
150. La. R.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
151. La. Civ. Code arts. 86-97.
152. The statement that appears in the declaration for couples to be married for the first time
(La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998)) does not appear in the declaration to be signed by already
married spouses who are converting their marriage to a covenant marriage. See La. &S.
9:275(C)(1)(a) (Supp. 1998). The reasons should be obvious.
153. As well as already married couples. See La. S. 9:275(C)(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
154. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998).
155. See 1997 La. Acts No. 1380, § 5.
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having read the Covenant Marriage Act. 5 6 To subsequently allege and prove
that a spouse was in error'5 7 in contracting a covenant marriage after all of the
information is provided in many varied forms presents substantial hurdles.
Just as with error, proving fraud induced a spouse's consent 58 to a
covenant marriage will be difficult as a general proposition, with one notable
exception. In the Declaration the prospective spouses also attest to the
disclosure: "We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another
everything which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this mar-
riage."'' 9  This statement affirms disclosure of information by each spouse
which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage-a
disclosure of information that one spouse believes if discovered by the other
could result in a broken engagement. For information that could adversely affect
the decision of the other spouse to marry, the statement transforms a potential
"suppression of the truth"'6 into a "misrepresentation,' 16' and that transfor-
mation has consequences. 62 Withholding information and misrepresenting its
disclosure must be with the intention to "obtain an unjust advantage for one party
or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other."' 63 If the other spouse suffers
an "inconvenience,"'" such as being married to a person whom he would not
have married had he known the truth, then the law may assume the fraudulent
intent of the person withholding the truth.
If the withheld information substantially influenced the other spouse's
consent, 165 then the covenant marriage may be annulled for fraud unless the
other spouse could have "ascertained the truth without difficulty, inconvenience,
or special skill."'" If the other spouse could have "ascertained the truth
without difficulty," the law assumes that the judgment of the other spouse
156. See La. P.S. 9:273(A)(I) (Supp. 1998): "We have read the Covenant Marriage Act, and
we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life."
157. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1949-1952.
158. La. Civ. Code arts. 1953-1958. See generally Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error
Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
159. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
160. La. Civ. Code art. 1953. See also comment (b): "Under this Article, fraud may result not
only from an act, such as a false assertion or suppression of the truth, but also from a failure to act,
such as silence, that is calculated to produce a misleading effect."
161. Id. See also Carriere, supra note 3, at 1728-29: "In contrast to other statements in the
declaration [see discussion in supra notes 131-141 and infra notes 182-260], this is not an aspiration
for the future, but an acknowledgment that an act took place in the past. At least for covenant
marriages, a court seeking free consent should look beyond the ceremonial words to how the other
party elicited them, and fraud should be regarded as vitiating it."
162. See La. Civ. Code art. 1954.
163. La. Civ. Code art. 1953.
164. See Orr v. Walker, 236 La. 740, 109 So. 2d 77 (1959), for an example of the meaning of
inconvenience (certain rights incapable of monetary appraisal), as distinguished from loss, which is
generally understood to mean pecuniary loss.
165. La. Civ. Code art. 1955.
166. La. Civ. Code art. 1954.
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influenced his decision more than the withholding of information by his fiance.
Nonetheless, there is one exception to this assumption: "[w]hen a relation of
confidence has reasonably induced a party to rely on the other's assertions or
representations."'67 Thus, even if the other spouse could have ascertained the
truth without difficulty, he may have reasonably relied on the representations of
the deceitful spouse because of their confidential relationship. Clearly, a
"confidential relationship" exists between prospective spouses' so that the
other spouse could reasonably rely on the representation of disclosure made in
the Declaration of Intent, even if he could have ascertained the truth without
difficulty. The conversion of a suppression of the truth to a misrepresentation
through the statement contained in the Declarationof Intent has consequences for
proof of fraud, which in all cases need be proved by a simple preponderance of
the evidence. 6 9 A misrepresentation makes proof of fraud easier when a
confidential relationship exists between the two parties. Under this analysis, the
spouse who was misled may annul the "covenant" marriage.7'7 Because the
covenant marriage "contracted" by the spouses is null for fraud, the nullity is
relative 7 ' and may be confirmed, either expressly or tacitly,72 upon discov-
ery of the deception by the spouse who was misled. 73
167. Id. See also comment (b): "Under the exception provided in the second paragraph of thisArticle, there is fraud even when a party could have readily ascertained the truth without difficulty,inconvenience, or special skill, when a relation of confidence has induced the party to rely on the
other's assertions or representations." Notice that suppression of the truth, silence and inaction are
not included.
168. For the most recent example of a confidential relationship, see La. Civ. Code art. 1483.
The ordinary standard of persuasion to annul a last will and testament for undue influence is clear
and convincing evidence. However, if a relationship of confidence existed between the wrongdoer
and the testator, then the burden of persuasion is reduced to a simple preponderance of the evidence
unless the wrongdoer is related to the testator by affinity, consanguinity or adoption. In comment(c) the redactors explain that a confidential relationship generally will affect the burden of proof but
that the Article does not lower the standard ofproof "where a challenge is made against a confidante
who is related to the donor by marriage.., because in many instances the most likely persons who
would be involved would be a spouse or child." (emphasis added). Clearly, husbands and wives
enjoy a confidential relationship; therefore, an engaged couple should enjoy a confidential
relationship.
169. La. Civ. Code art. 1957.
170. La. Civ. Code arts. 2031 (relative nullity if lack of free consent), 2032 (five-year liberative
prescription to begin with discovery), 2033 (effect of annulment).
Arguably, unlike a relatively null marriage, it could be argued that the covenant spouse who annuls
the covenant marriage for fraud may claim damages and attorney's fees. La. Civ. Code art. 1958.
A "standard" marriage may be annulled if consent is given under duress or by one incapable ofdiscernment, but the specific Civil Code articles (La. Civ. Code arts. 95, 97, 101) indicate that
annulment is the only remedy available. Compare the remedy available if an ordinary contract is
annulled for duress. La. Civ. Code art. 1964.
171. La. Civ. Code art. 2031. Cf La. Civ. Code art. 95.
172. See La. Civ. Code art. 95 and comments thereto for analogous treatment of tacit
confirmation by cohabitation of the couple.
173. La. Civ. Code art. 1842. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 95.
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Yet, despite annulment of the covenant marriage, the spouse who was misled
remains in a "standard" marriage, unless fraud can also be invoked to annul a
"standard" marriage." By contrast to the vice of consent of duress,'7" the
Civil Code does not explicitly provide that if fraud induces consent to marriage
the marriage is null. An argument can be made that because a "standard"
marriage "is created by civil contract' 76 and the examples of lack of free
consent are not necessarily exclusive' a spouse may resort to general princi-
ples of the law of conventional obligations for relief, including the law affecting
consent. 7" However, "[r]elative nullity has not been used to invalidate
marriages in which consent was given on the-basis of false or inadequate
information concerning the spouse."' 79 Thus, the court is most unlikely to
annul the remaining "standard" marriage upon proof of fraud. In recognition of
the practice of the judiciary, Article 93 when enacted in 1987 eliminated
"mistake respecting the person" as an instance in which consent to marry was not
freely given.'
The inconsistency in the jurisprudence of relative nullity has been
unimportant under the traditional regime; the ease and speed with which
174. See Samuel, supra note 4: "Nevertheless, in Louisiana I hear the objection that covenant
marriage will not be freely chosen, but will be forced upon immature couples by their parents,
priests, ministers, or rabbis. A situation of true duress by parents and clergy could be remedied by
invalidating the couple's consent to the covenant marriage and treating the marriage as a non-
covenant marriage. But when the choice of covenant marriage is a result not of duress, but of
religious or moral scruples instilled in the couple from childhood, the choice should be considered
free and binding, especially since the marriage will notbe absolutely indissoluble." (emphasis added).
175. La. Civ. Code arts. 1948, 1959-1964. See La. Civ. Code art. 93: "Consent is not free
when given under duress... ." (emphasis added).
176. La. Civ. Code art. 86. See Katherine S. Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One
Baby Step Forward, 48 La. L Rev. 1131, 1145 (1988).
177. Louisiana Civil Code article 93 provides that "[c]onsent is not free if given under duress
or when given by a person incapable of discernment." The Article does not provide that consent is
not free only in those two instances. See also Spaht, supra note 176, at 1145.
178. La. Civ. Code arts. 1927-1965.
See Spaht, supra note 176, at 1145: "An argument can be made that article 93 does not declare
that the reasons for defective consent are exclusive. Therefore, an aggravated case involving a
mistake in physical identity could be resolved by resort to the general articles on error. A
justification for resorting to those articles is that article 86 defines marriage as a relationship created
by civil contract. The words civil contract were used for two reasons: (1) To demonstrate the
historical assertion of jurisdiction over marriage by secular authorities and (2) To permit analogy to
the law of conventional obligations when appropriate."
179. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1728. See Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394,37 So. 2d 847 (La. 1948);
Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (La. 1899); Verneuille v. Vemeuille, 438 So. 2d 615
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); McKee v. McKee, 262 So. 2d Ill (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972). See also
Spaht, supra note 110, at 81-82, 84-91.
180. La. Civ. Code art. 93 cmt. (e), as enacted in 1987 La. Acts No. 886, § 1: "[T]his Article
omits reference to 'mistake respecting the person' as a cause of invalidity. The jurisprudence strictly
interpreted that language as referring only to mistakes of physical identity.... As so limited, the
omitted language was never applied to invalidate a marriage in Louisiana."
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the victim of imposition could obtain a no-fault divorce made claims of
relative nullity a rare legal event.""
IV. SECOND DISTINGUISHING FEATURE: AGREEMENT TO PRE-DIVORCE
COUNSELING
If we experience marital difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all
reasonable efforts to preserve our marriage, including marital counsel-
ing.182
A. Declaration of Intent as Contract
Covenant couples in their Declarationof Intent agree to take reasonable steps
to preserve their marriage; and this agreement, which is a limited exceptionto the
general principle that spouses' personal obligations are matters of public
order,8 3 constitutes a contractual obligation..8 4 The intention of the legislature
in including this statement in the Declaration was not simply to provide an
"aspirational statement,'.' which explains why the counselor must discuss "the
obligation'8 6 to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulties.... ,,8 7
181. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1728.
182. La. R1S. 9:273(AX) (Supp. 1998).
183. La. Civ. Code arts. 98 (see also comment (e)), 1968. See also cases cited in supra note
179.
184. La. Civ. Code art. 1906: "A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby
obligations are created, modified, or extinguished." (emphasis added).
185. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1712:
A more likely intent on the part of the legislature was to provide a statement of the
aspirations of the parties to a covenant marriage. The commitment to seek marital
counseling occurs in the declaration of intent, in the midst of other statements couched
as agreements and promises, but conveying aspirations rather than constituting binding
contracts.
See Samuel, supra note 4: "Treatment of the counseling agreement as aspirational rather than as
a requirement would solve this problem, but LA R.S. 9:307A appears to make counseling a
requirement before the judgment of divorce can be obtained."
186. Obligation is defined in La. Civ. Code art. 1756: "An obligation is a legal relationship
whereby a person, called the obligor, is bound to render a performance in favor of another, called
the obligee.... ." See also La. Civ. Code art. 1760 cmt. (b) (obligation without preceding adjective
means "civil" obligation which can be enforced by legal action). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1758
(effect of obligation).
By contrast, the aspirational statement in the Declaration of Intent that a covenant marriage is for
life is treated differently in the provision that mandates the content ofpre-marital counseling. The
counselor "shall include ... communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is a commitment
for life .. " La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
187. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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The legislature intended that this obligation be legally enforceable through
contractual remedies, rather than as a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a
separation or divorce. This intention is evident because of the failure of the
legislation to be more explicit concerning the effect of a failure to take
reasonable steps (efforts).' The construction of the sentence in both lettered
paragraphs of Section 307 mentions counseling"9 in the introductory clause as
preliminary to a covenant spouse obtaining a judgment of divorce or separation.
However, when the same sentence in its main clause addresses the obtaining of
the judgment and includes the word only, the sole requirement for the judgment
is proof of one of the grounds listed.'" The procedural mechanism for raising
the counseling prerequisite would be either a dilatory 9" or peremptory"92
exception, but neither seems applicable to the action for separation or divorce in
a covenant marriage. Because the legislation does not use the word only to
describe the preliminary counseling, the exception could not be peremptory." 3
Likewise, because the obligation to take reasonable steps will not be enforced by
specific performance,' 94 the dilatory exception appears inappropriate because
such an exception assumes that whatever prevents the maturity of the action can
be cured.'" Even though the obligation to take reasonable steps does not
constitute a necessary prerequisite to the action for divorce or separation," the
availability of contractual remedies at least restores some legal remedy to the
spouse who has fulfilled her promises and desires to preserve the marriage.9
188. La. R.S. 9:307(A) (Supp. 1998): "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and
subsequent to the parties obtaining counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a
judgment of divorce only upon proof of.... (emphasis added).
189. See infra discussion in text at notes 218-235 that reasonable steps to preserve the marriage
may include steps that are not marital counseling.
190. See supra text at note 188.
191. La. Code Civ. P. art. 926.
192. Id. art. 927.
193. A peremptory exception under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 927 is no cause
of action. Without the strength of only to support the argument that no judgment of divorce or
separation can be rendered in a "covenant" marriage without counseling first, there is little basis for
arguing that there is no cause of action.
194. See infra discussion in text at notes 238-245.
195. A dilatory exception can be raised under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 926 if
the action is premature. The argument would be that "counseling" under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:307(A), (B) is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for divorce or separation and thus that the
action is premature until compliance with the obligation to seek counseling. However, because the
obligation may not be enforced by specific performance, the obligation may not ever be fulfilled.
196. By virtue of the simple phrase contained in Section 307 and the fact that there is no specific
mechanism for counseling as a required prerequisite for filing a petition for divorce, a persuasive
argument can be made that counseling is not a preliminary requirement for divorce in a covenant
marriage. But see Samuel, supra note 4, at n.20.
See Carriere, supra note 3, at 1712: "Moreover, if the state were to require counseling as a
preliminary to separation or to divorce, it might, under Boddie v. Connecticut, have to subsidize the
counseling for the indigent."
197. See infra discussion in text at notes 238-260. The author disagrees with the observation
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As an aspect of the Declaration of Intent that is a matter of contract rather
than status, the agreement to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage is
subject to the more general rules of conventional obligations. 9 ' Therefore, the
agreement to take reasonable steps also may be dissolved by mutual consent'99
unless the obligation is a matter of public order.200 The agreement to dissolve
a contract is itself a contract; and if the reasonable steps to preserve the marriage
is a matter of public order that once agreed to cannot be altered by the parties,
then the agreement cannot be dissolved by mutual consent. Considering the
purpose of the covenant marriage legislation to strengthen marriage,2 1 a strong
argument can be made that once covenant spouses agree to take steps to preserve
their marriage in the Declaration the agreement, as a matter of public policy,
cannot be altered by the parties.
The spouses' agreement to take reasonable steps "must be performed in good
faith.2 02  Good faith is not defimed in the Civil Code0 3 nor is the term
sufficiently defined in the jurisprudence.2 The judiciary appears to determine
"good faith" within the context of the specific contract, and in at least one case
the court seemingly equated failure to perform in "good faith" with conduct of
the obligor that bordered on "bad faith. 20 5 In Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. Mecom,0 6 the court held that the duty of good faith does not require a party
to a contract to remind the other party of his contractual duties. Based upon
these cases, the spouse who desires to preserve the marriage does not fail to
perform the agreement in "good faith" if she fails to remind the other party of
by Professor Jeanne Carriere in her article, Carriere, supra note 3, at 1711-12: "However, whether
a meaningful remedy exists is doubtful.... Damages, the more usual remedy for the breach of a
contract of such a personal nature, are equally pointless for achieving the stated goal of the
legislation.. . ." (emphasis added). The legislation has more than one goal and restoration ofpower
to the spouse who desires to preserve the marriage is one of them. The availability of damages is
simply another weapon in her arsenal.
198. Title IV of Book III, comprised of La. Civ. Code arts. 1906-2057.
199. See La. Civ. Code art. 1983. The covenant marriage itself, which includes issues of status
that are matters ofpublic order (i.e. termination by divorce), may not be dissolved by mutual consent.
See infra discussion in text at notes 318-320.
200. See La. Civ. Code art. 1968.
201. See supra discussion in text at notes 4246.
202. La. Civ. Code arts. 1983 (contracts) and 1759 (obligations).
203. See La. Civ. Code art. 3506.
204. See, eg., Grisaffi v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 43 F.3d 982 (5th Cir. 1995); Delta Truck
& Tractor, Inc. v. J.1. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1992); CNB v. Audubon, 566 So. 2d 1136
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
205. Bad faith is defined in comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code article 1997 as an act that is
intentional and malicious. In Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.l. Case Co., 975 F.2d 1192, 1204 (5th
Cir. 1992), the court found that a contractual party had breached its duty to act in good faith as a
matter of law:. ".... IH sold its agricultural equipment business to Case knowing that the transaction
would result in the termination of IH dealers without cause .... IH deliberately structured the
transaction so as to leave the terminated IH dealers with little or no recourse against either IH or
Case."
206. 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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his duty to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage." 7 He, on the other
hand, does fail to perform the contract in "good faith" if he engages in
intentional and malicious conduct that prevents taking reasonable steps to
preserve the marriage. More often than not, the spouse who no longer desires
to be married will have breached the obligation by his non-performance, and his
failure to perform the contract in "good faith" will be academic. Nonetheless,
for some cases in which a spouse argues that he took "reasonable steps to
preserve the marriage," but his conduct belies "good faith", the court may award
damages.
A spouse may rescind this agreement to take reasonable steps to preserve the
marriage for the vices of consent-error,23 fraud,2°9 or duress.2" °  In an
effort to eliminate the possibility of error or fraud, the counselor must discuss the
obligation to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulties as a part of
the pre-marital counseling.2t' The truthful disclosure by the counselor and his
discussion of the obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage
attested to by the notary provide insurance against error or fraud. Error will be
difficult to allege and prove if after such counseling the spouse who is seeking
relief signed the Declaration of Intent which contained his agreement to take
reasonable steps to preserve his marriage. Even if there were a misrepresentation
about the statement contained in the document, fraud may be difficult to prove
since the truth arguably could have been ascertained by simply reading the
document.2t2 The Senate Committee amendment that required this obligation
to be explained both in the pamphlet and in the counseling session proves the
intention of the legislature that the couple have all of the information necessary
to make a decision deliberately and knowledgeably.
One criticism of the legal efficacy of the agreement to "counseling"2 3 is
that "coercive marital counseling" does not work.214 The two systems, one in
207. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998).
208. La. Civ. Code arts. 1949-1952.
209. La. Civ. Code arts. 1953-1958.
210. La. Civ. Code arts. 1959-1964.
211. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998). In addition the counselor must sign a notarized
affidavit that he counseled them consistent with their own affidavit. See also La. ItS. 9:273(A)(2)(b)
(Supp. 1998).
212. See La. Civ. Code art. 1954 (no fraud if could have ascertained the truth without difficulty).
213. "Reasonable steps" does notnecessarily mean only marital counseling. See infra discussion
in text at notes 218-235.
214. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1712-13:
The Los Angeles Conciliation Court of the 1950s permitted a spouse who felt that his
marriage was in difficulty to petition for a conciliation hearing, at which the other
spouse's attendance could be compelled. The goal of the court was to effect reconcilia-
tion by means of counseling that led to a detailed "reconciliation agreement," itself
enforceable through use of the court's contempt power to impose fines and even
imprisonment. Even though at least one spouse probably wanted to save the marriage,
California's experiment with compulsory conciliation was apparently a failure. [n.71 at
1712 cites J. Herbie DiFonzo, Beneath the Fault Line: The Popular and Legal Culture
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California and the other an experiment in New Jersey,21 do not resemble the
binding agreement of the spouses to a covenant marriage. In the first place, the
contractual agreement to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage will not
in the ordinary case result in compelling a spouse's attendance at counseling, i.e.,
specific performance." In the second place, the law does not impose this
obligation upon every spouse whose marriage is experiencing difficulty, as in
California and New Jersey. The obligation is only imposed upon every spouse
who promised to take reasonable steps to preserve his marriage after being
informed of the nature of the obligation he undertook. Being bound by one's
promises voluntarily made is qualitatively different from being required to submit
to "counseling" by sole imposition of the law.2"'
B. Agreement to Take All "Reasonable" Steps
The spouses agree to take all "reasonable" steps to preserve their marriage,
including marriage counseling. Nothing in the agreement or the legislation
suggests that marriage counseling is the exclusive "reasonable" step, in fact the
inference is quite the opposite. By simply offering marital counseling as an
illustrative example, the legislature in no way intended to limit the spouses to a
particular type of "step." Reasonable steps to preserve the marriage could
include sessions with family or friends during which the couple discusses the
difficulties in their marriage. Within the religious community support groups of
all types exist which could be consulted in an effort to preserve the marriage,
such as Sunday School classes, Bible study groups, and mentoring couples.
"Steps" could likewise include living in separate bedrooms in the same house
("cooling off'), separate buildings on the same piece of property, or in separate
dwellings while the spouses discuss the marital disharmony. Whether the "steps"
are "reasonable"will depend upon the circumstances. What may be "reasonable"
when one spouse has abandoned the other may not be reasonable if one spouse
has physically abused the other.
As previously observed," the contractual obligation to take reasonable
steps to preserve the marriage must be performed in good faith.2"9 It can be
in Twentieth Century America (1997), which concludes that there are no reliable
statistics.] A similar experiment in New Jersey likewise failed. Beginning in September
1957, the New Jersey Legislature established "quasi-mandatory marriage counseling" for
those seeking divorce in two districts of the state. After three years, the program ended
with a failure rate of 97.3 percent.
215. Id.
216. See infra discussion in text at notes 238-245.
217. Analogously, Samuel, supra note 4, opines: "But when a couple has voluntarily chosen
a strict regime of divorce after premarital counseling on the subject, there is no justification for the
lawyer or judge to manipulate or allow manipulation of the law or evidence to effect a divorce for
such a couple."
218. See supra discussion in text at notes 202-207.
219. La. Civ. Code arts. 1983 and 1759.
1998]
LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
argued that should one spouse agree to marital counseling but only for one
session because he is intent upon divorcing, or should the spouse also insist that
he choose the counselor, it may be that he has breached his obligation by not
performing it in good faith.22 The requirement that the obligation be per-
formed in good faith permits the court to examine the motives of a spouse even
in instances where the spouse has mechanically fulfilled his obligation to attend
marital counseling. Should the court determine that the insistent spouse has not
performed his obligation in good faith the other spouse may be awarded
damages.22'
Of ultimate importance is that the "steps" to be taken are steps that attempt
to "preserve the marriage"; and, as has been observed elsewhere,'m therapists
often fail to consider the family as a unit when marital difficulties arise.
Therapists, consisting of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, andmarriage
counselors,'m are trained to devote their professional efforts to maximizing the
individual spouse's fulfillment and happiness. 4  As regards their alleged
"venal" motive of a lucrative professional opportunity offered as experts in
family cases, " some therapists sensing a shifting cultural trend now endorse
"marriage education and enrichment" 2 6 as a new field of professional opportu-
nity. The authors of the covenant marriage legislation anticipate that many
covenant couples who later experience marital difficulties will seek
assistance from the same individual who provided their pre-marital counsel-
ing. In virtually all cases, that individual will be a religious figure: a
minister, priest or rabbi. Counseling by a religious figure should227 stress
220. See supra discussion of the jurisprudence in text at notes 202-207.
221. Id. See also infra discussion in text at notes 238-260.
222. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1713-14. See also Gallagher, Whitehead, supra note 80;
Whitehead, supra note 16; William J. Doherty, How Therapists Threaten Marriages, The Responsive
Community, Summer 1997, at 31; Peter Kramer, Divorce and Our National Values, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1997, at 23A.
223. "The present lack of licensing for marriage counselors in Louisiana adds a further danger
to the marriages of receptive couples who in good faith entrust themselves to an untrained
mountebank." Carriere, supra note 3, at 1714. See supra discussion in text at notes 113-120.
224. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1713-14:
One reason given for the alleged hostility toward marriage is the philosophical dedication
of therapists to their clients' individual fulfillment and happiness, rather than to saving
their marriages .... In the unlikely event that the accusations that marriage counselors
in general encourage divorce were true, the obligation to seek counseling in a covenant
marriage might increase, rather than decrease divorce.
(Emphasis added). But see Kramer, supra note 222.
225. "But a venal, as well as a philosophical, motive for advocating divorce has been attributed
to marriage counselors: divorcing couples and family courts make extensive use of psychological
expertise, creating a 'bonanza' for the helping professions." Carriere, supra note 3, at 1713.
226. Among such therapists is Diane Sollee, Director of Coalition for Marriage, Family and
Couples Education. She organized the Second Annual Smart Marriages/Happy Marriages Conference
in Washington, D.C. held July 8-12.
227. The author is not willing to state unequivocally that the counseling by a religious figure
will emphasize preservation of the marriage because of the statements about covenant marriage by
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preservation of the marriage and emphasize the importance of the family
unit, rather than concentrate upon one spouse's individual happiness.
What's more, the religious figure will undoubtedly not be morally
neutral; 8 thus, he will not hesitate to assign blame to the spouse who,
for example, committed adultery, abandoned the other spouse for no good
reason, physically or sexually abused the spouse or children, or committed
a felony.
Even though counseling is not a mandatory prerequisite to filing for
divorce,229 commentators have criticized the agreement to take "reasonable"
steps to preserve the marriage as subjecting victims of domestic violence to
potential loss of life." Assuming that domestic violence is as widespread a
phenomena as some writers suggest," t the agreement only binds the victim to
take "reasonable" steps to preserve the marriage. In most cases of domestic
violence where the spouse has been the victim, joint counseling would not be
reasonable. No obligation to preserve the covenant marriage assumed by the
victim of violence requires her to risk her lifeY 2 Reasonable steps to preserve
the marriage could include her individual counseling through a battered women's
program and a separate intervention with the batterer who also submits to
additional therapy. Interestingly, one story of a Louisiana covenant spouse who
was physically abused by the other offers hope that under controlled circumstanc-
es even joint counseling may be accomplished with beneficial consequences.
With additional protection provided her, and upon the advice, of her
attorney, the victim spouse attended a joint marital counseling session with
at least one leader of a religious denomination. See statements by Episcopal Bishop Charles Jenkins
in the Times-Picayune, supra note 49.
228. "Second, the neutral moral stance of marital counselors, according to conservative
commentators, encourages divorce by failing to assign blame to the spouse responsible for the
breakdown of the maniage." Carriere, supra note 3, at 1713.
The conservative commentators to whom Carriere refers are Whitehead, supra note 16, and
Gallagher, Whitehead, supra note 80.
229. See supra discussion in text at notes 188-197.
230. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1714: "Whatever hypothetical benefits mandated counseling
offers, they are more than offset by its most serious drawback: the obligation to obtain counseling,
if treated as a mandatory step prior to divorce for those In a covenant marriage, may endanger
battered spouses." (emphasis added). The subsection of Carriere's article in which this statement
appears is entitled, "Risking Lives to Save Marriages." See also Samuel, supra note 4, at n.20.
231. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1714: "This is not a negligible group; domestic violence is an
experience common to '[u]p to one half of all American women-and approximately two thirds of
women who are separated or divorced,' according to Martha Mahoney [Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991)].
Mahoney's calculations underreport domestic violence because, first, she examined only female
victims and, second, a recent report by the Justice Department indicates that occurrences have been
startlingly underestimated."
232. "The Louisiana Legislature has recognized the danger that separation poses to spouses and
children and has sought to protect these victims through the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief
Act" Carriere, supra note 3, at 1715. The Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act is contained
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:361-69.
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the abusing spouse conducted by the couple's minister. The minister did
not hesitate to blame the husband for the couple's marital difficulties. By
virtue of his moral authority to instill shame and inflict humiliation upon
the abusing spouse in the presence of others, the minister performed a
service that benefitted the victim, society and the abuser.233 Should the
victim be sued by the batterer for breach of her obligation to take
"reasonable" steps to preserve the marriage, her defense would be the
unavailability of "reasonable" alternative steps in light of the degree of
violence perpetrated by the batterer. Furthermore, by analogy the victim
could argue that the bad faith of the abusing spouse prevented her perfor-
mance.2 4  His bad faith consisted of the intentional and malicious
actP5 of physical abuse which threatened her life and thus prevented her
performance.
C. Content of the Pre-Divorce Counseling
The core of the content of pre-divorce counseling, as already men-
tioned, 6 consists of "reasonable steps to preserve the marriage." That
agreement of the spouses as to the aim of pre-divorce counseling
determines the contours of the counseling; its content is not specified by
the legislation. Clearly, the spouses commit to reasonable steps to preserve
the marriage; thus, counseling that emphasizes the fulfillment and happiness
of the individual to the exclusion of the other members of the family
would not conform to the spouses' agreement. Religious figures who
counsel are more likely to emphasize the preservation of the marriage.
Some denominations, such as the Catholic Church, or other faith-based
organizations, such as Marriage Savers, offer programs with a remarkable
success rate.237
233. In a footnote in her article in the same section in which she so severely criticizes the
"counseling" agreement in a covenant marriage, Professor Carriere observes: "It is difficult to
understand the logic by which assigning blame to a party dissatisfied with her or his marriage is
viewed as a means of preventing marital breakdown; it seems that it would supply an added source
of grievance and an added impetus to end the marriage. Of course, if the blame is deserved, as in
the case of a battering spouse, then such a result (assuming safe separation from the batterer) could
benefit both the victim and society." Carriere, supra note 3, at 1714 n.80 (emphasis added).
234. La. Civ. Code art. 2003: "An obligee may not recover damages when his own bad faith
has caused the obligor's failure to perform. ... If the obligee's negligence contributes to the
obligor's failure to perform, the damages are reduced in proportion to that negligence."
In addition if the abuser had failed to perform his obligation to take reasonable steps, the victim
could raise the defense of nonperformance. La. Civ. Code art. 2022.
235. La. Civ. Code art. 1997, cmt. (b).
236. See supra discussion in text at notes 222-228.
237. The Catholic program, Retrouvaille, an outgrowth of Marriage Encounter, has a very
successful track record in preserving marriages. For information about Marriage Savers and
Retrouvaille, see Michael J. McManus, Marriage Savers (1995).
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D. Remedies for Breach of Agreement to Take Reasonable Steps
The law characterizes the obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve the
marriage if marital difficulties arise as an obligation to do"' subject to a
suspensive condition." '9 Upon fulfillment of the condition (marital difficul-
ties),24 the obligation is enforceable. If one spouse breaches the obligation,24'
which in the ordinary case will be by nonperformance, 4 ' the other may seek
legal redress during the marriage. 4 Because the obligation to take reasonable
steps is an obligation to do, the court would ordinarily award damages rather
than specific performance, although specific performance is within the discretion
of the court.244 Professor Carriere accurately observes that "compelling an
unwilling party to attend marriage counseling, either as an exercise of state
power in a family law action or as specific performance in contract, appears self-
defeating if the goal is to reconcile the couple. 2 45
Nonetheless, the spouse affected by the other's breach may seek damages,
both pecuniary24' and non-pecuniary. 247  Pecuniary damages consist of dam-
ages to compensate for pecuniary loss sustained and the profit of which the
spouse was deprived by the other's breach. Pecuniary loss sustained may
include, if causally related to the breach,43 increased expenses for maintaining
two households rather than one during the period of separation or expenses
238. La. Civ. Code art. 1986.
239. La. Civ. Code art. 1767.
240. "The difficulty ofproving that marital difficulties existed may be bootstrapped by the court,
because the presence of the couple in the courtroom would be evidence enough that they do."
Carriere, supra note 3, at 1711.
241. A breach may occur, according to Louisiana Civil Code article 1994, if a spouse fails to
perform by nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance.
242. Id.
243. La. R.S. 9:308(A) (Supp. 1998): "Unless judicially separated, spouses in a covenant
marriage may not sue each other except for causes of action pertaining to contracts." (emphasis
added).
244. La. Civ. Code art. 1986: "Upon a failure to perform an obligation that has another object,
such as an obligation to do, the granting of specific performance is at the discretion of the court."
See also comment (c): "If the obligation which the obligee has failed to perform is an obligation
to do, the granting of specific performance lies with the discretion of the court, to be exercised in
a manner consistent nith the principle that the obligor's personal freedom ordinarily may not be
encroached upon." (emphasis added).
245. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1711.
246. La. Civ. Code art. 1995 (loss sustained and profit deprived).
247. La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
248. La. Civ. Code art. 1994: "An obligor is liable for the damages caused by his failure to
perform a conventional obligation." (emphasis added).
Causation, of course, is a serious issue in the breach of a contractual object like that in the
Declaration of Intent. For analogous jurisprudence, see Sanders v. Gore, 676 So. 2d 866 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1996) (breach of promise to marry; promise to many against public policy because married
to someone else at time promise made); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(breach of promise to marry; failed to prove breach caused damages).
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necessitated by attempts to obtain the other spouse's compliance with the
obligation.249 In the former case a causal connection could be proved if
"reasonable steps" would have included living together while steps to preserve
the marriage were pursued. Profit of which the spouse was deprived would
ordinarily not include lost future profits because of the difficulty of proving
causation with sufficient precision."5 Furthermore, the ultimate recovery of
these pecuniary damages will depend upon whether the other spouse who refuses
to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage fails to perform in "good
faith"25 ' or "bad faith,""2 the latter defined as a failure to perform that is
both intentional and malicious.253 Circumstances surrounding the failure to
perform ordinarily prove the breach was intentional. However, to constitute bad
faith the breach must also be malicious, designed to injure the offended spouse.
Proof of malice may or may not be difficult depending upon the existing
evidence. Evidence of particular importance is that contemporaneous with the
failure to perform, such as the response of the obligor to entreaties by the obligee
to attend counseling sessions.
The aggrieved covenant spouse may recover nonpecuniary loss because the
nature of the agreement is "intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and,
because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance
of the contract"2 4 the other spouse knew, or should have known "that his
failure to perform would cause that kind of lOss.,,21 s "That kind of loss" refers
to "damage of a moral nature which does not affect a 'material' or tangible part
of a person's patrimony," 256 but damage that is more than "mere worry or
vexation. ' '2" Examples of the type of loss suffered by the aggrieved spouse if
249. Such expenses might include rent or house note, ordinary living expenses (i.e. food,
furnishings, staples, telephone, utilities, etc.). and other extraordinary expenses related to living
separately from the spouse who desires to preserve the marriage.
250. See, eg., Fussel v. La. Business College of Monroe, Inc., 519 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988); Folds v. Red Arrow Towbar Sales Co., 378 So. 2d 1054 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
One possible claim to lost future profits might succeed if the breaching spouse obtained a
separation of property judgment after living separate and apart from the plaintifffor six months. See
La. Civ. Code art. 2374(D). If the plaintiff spouse could prove that living together was a reasonable
step to take to preserve the marriage but that the other spouse had refused, the plaintiff might be able
to recover her one-half interest in what would have been community property but for the judgment
of separation of property. Ultimate recovery would depend upon the strength of the plaintiff's
argument about living together as a reasonable step and the extent of her recovery upon proof of how
long that living together would have been a reasonable.
251. La. Civ. Code art. 1996: "An obligor in good faith is liable only for the damages that were
foreseeable at the time the contract was made."
252. La. Civ. Code art. 1997: "An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable
or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform."
253. La. Civ. Code art. 1997, cmt. (b).
254. La. Civ. Code art. 1998. See also Saul Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations in the Louisiana
Jurisprudence 517-32 (4th ed. 1997).
255. La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
256. Id. cmt. (b).
257. Id. cmt. (e).
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the other breaches his obligation include embarrassment, mental anguish,
humiliation, and psychological damage."' As to these damages, Article 1999
affords the court "much discretion."2 59  The sum awarded for these non-
pecuniary damages need not be nominal."
E. 4 Component that Survives a Migratory Divorce
A covenant marriage represents a status combined with permissible
contractual agreements between the spouses. Being married or divorced is a
matter of status;26' however, the obligation to "take reasonable steps to preserve
the marriage, including marital counseling" is a matter of contract.262 For
purposes of jurisdiction and conflict of laws, the distinction is important.
Whether a covenant spouse may leave Louisiana, establish a domicile in Texas
and then sue for divorce under Texas law is generally accepted as a matter of the
law relating to status. 263 Thus, a covenant spouse who wishes to divorce under
laws less stringent than those to which he committed himself may travel to Texas
and if he establishes a domicile,26 may obtain a divorce under the less restric-
tive law of Texas. Professor Carriere accurately describes the result of two
United States Supreme Court decisions in Williams v. North Carolina:265
"Covenant marriage partners do have another option that makes quick divorce,
even unilateral quick divorce, a possibility: divorce in a different jurisdic-
tion."2"
Nonetheless, even if a covenant spouse's status as married or divorced may
be governed by the law of the new domicile (Texas), the other spouse may argue
that a breach of the obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage
is a matter of contract.267 Under the provisions of Louisiana's long-arm
statute,268 the covenant spouse who remained in Louisiana could seek damages
from her spouse now domiciled in Texas for breach of his obligation to take all
258. See, e.g., Sanders v. Gore, 676 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (damages for breach
of promise to marry); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (damages for breach
of promise to marry).
259. La. Civ. Code art. 1999: "When damages are insusceptible of precise measurement, much
discretion shall be left to the court for the reasonable assessment of these damages."
260. Id. cmt. (b).
261. See Williams v. North Carolina 1, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina II, 325
U.S. 226 (1945). See also La. Code Civ. P. art. l0(A)(7).
262. See supra discussion in text at notes 138-141, 183-188..
263. See supra authorities cited in note 261.
264. Domicile is residence in fact with an intention to remain permanently or indefinitely. See
La. Civ. Code art. 42. See Mississippi Bd. of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109
S. Ct. 1597, 1608 (1989).
265. See supra note 261.
266. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1731.
267. See supra discussion in text at notes 138-141, 183-188.
268. La. R.S. 13:3201(B) (1991), as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 273, § 1.
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reasonable steps to preserve the marriage.269 Even though the first paragraph
of the long-arm statute does not provide explicitly for personal jurisdiction in
such a case, the second paragraph permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the Texas domiciliary "on any basis consistent with the constitution of the
state and of the Constitution of the United States." 70 Under the relevant
federal"7 and state" jurisprudence, Louisiana has specific jurisdiction273
over the Texas covenant spouse if he has meaningful minimum contacts with
Louisiana and the maintenance of the suit "does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 27 4
The plaintiff, who by the same suit may seek support for herself and any
children of the marriage, 2" bears the burden of proving the other spouse's
minimal contacts with Louisiana. 6 The spouse who is a domiciliary of Texas
had contacts with Louisiana which include: execution of the Declaration of Intent
in Louisiana after mandatory pre-marital counseling by a duly authorized
counselor, performance of the ceremony in Louisiana, residence in Louisiana
after the covenant marriage, and a former spouse and children who remain
domiciled in Louisiana to whom the defendant continues to owe an obligation of
support. Once the plaintiff proves minimal contacts, the burden shifts to the
nonresident defendant "to prove the exercise of jurisdiction 'would be so
unreasonable in light of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice as
to overcome the presumption of reasonableness... . ,,277 It will be difficult for
the nonresident defendant to prove that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him would be unreasonable since Louisiana specifically recognizes jurisdiction
269. See supra discussion in text at notes 238-260.
270. La. R.S. 13:3201(B) (1991), 1988 La. Acts No. 273, § 1.
271. See, eg., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); Dickson
Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1997).
272. See Anderson v. Interamerican Mfg., Inc., 693 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4thCir. 1997); Coastal
Credit Co., Inc. v. CSS, Inc., 685 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Teknika Electronics Corp.
v. SES/LA, 673 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
273. In interpreting the due process clause, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized a distinction between two types of personal jurisdiction-general and specific
jurisdiction.... When a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the state is exercising
specific jurisdiction over the defendant.
(Emphasis added.) Teknika Electronics Corp. v. SES/LA, 673 So. 2d 1129, 1133 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1996).
274. Id. at 1133-34.
275. La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(6) (1991), 1988 La. Acts No. 273, § 1: "A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident.... Non-support of
a child, parent, or spouse or a former spouse domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support
is owed and with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state." See Wicker v. Wicker, 597
So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
276. Coastal Credit Co., Inc. v. CSS, Inc., 685 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
277. Id. at 467 (quoting from deRcycs v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd., 586 So. 2d
103, 107 (La. 1991)).
[Vol. 59
KATHERINE SHA W SPAHT
over him when he has failed to support his spouse or his child.27 Trying the
related issues of support and damages for breach of the covenant marriage
agreement in one action in a Louisiana court serves the general concern for
efficient and just resolution of disputes arising between covenant spouses. 79
V. THIRD DISTINGUISHING FEATURE: LIMITED AND MORE TIME-CONSUMING
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND RESURRECTION OF LEGAL SEPARATION
Despite recognition that the covenant marriage law utilizes pre-marital and
pre-divorce counseling in an attempt to strengthen marriage, critics80 and
supporters2"' of the legislation focus on the defining component-limitations
on divorce. Critics are not deterred by the predicate element of consent of the
parties;. 2 they insist that "government" prevent a more binding commitment.
Some admit that their principal concern is that "what is voluntary today is
mandated tomorrow," although recent attempts to eliminate unilateral no-fault
divorce in this country have been singularly unsuccessful.283 Yet, at a time
when the divorce proponents breathed a collective sigh of relief, Louisiana
passed the covenant marriage law, referred to alternatively as "a stealth anti-
divorce weapon' 28 4 and as a "skunk.,,28S The historic significance of its
passage explains the indignant reaction: the covenant marriage legislation
represents the first time, as a general trend, in two hundred years in any Western
country that divorce has become more difficult rather than easier. 6
If a spouse agrees to a covenant marriage, divorce requires proof of fault in
the nature of adultery, conviction of a felony and a sentence of imprisonment at
278. La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(6) (1991), 1988 La. Acts No. 273, § 1.
Other relevant factors mentioned by the court in Teknika Electronics Corp. v. Satellite EarthStations of La., Inc., 673 So. 2d 1129, 1134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), appear to permit the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant "when he presents sufficient minimal contacts
that do not alone satisfy due process considerations." Factors to be considered include: ". . . theforum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, at least where that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to
choose the forum, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies."
279. The interest of the state of Louisiana in deciding an issue unique to Louisiana's covenant
marriage law is strong. The Louisiana judiciary will be more informed than judges from other states
about the distinct provisions of the covenant marriage statutes.
280. See supra authorities in notes 35-38.
281. Spaht, supra note 2; Samuel, supra note 4.
282. See, eg., Carriere, supra note 3; Bartlett, supra note 7.
283. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 7; Ellman & Lohr, supra note IS.
284. A Stealth Anti-Divorce Weapon, supra note 34, at 28.
285. See Ira Mark Ellman, Senate Bill Revives Horror of Fault Divorce, Ariz. Rep. B5, Fri.
March 6, 1998. Contra: Len Munsil, Proposal Weeds Out Less Committed, Ariz. Rep. B5, Fri.,
March 6, 1998.
286. The comparison of grounds for divorce in a "standard" marriage to those of a "covenant"
marriage occur in the text at infra notes 330-417.
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hard labor or death, abandonment (for one year), physical or sexual abuse of a
spouse or child of the parties,"' habitual intemperance or cruel treatmente ss
and a period of time living separate and apart thereafter.8 9 In addition to the
fault grounds for divorce, either spouse may obtain a divorce upon proof of
living separate and apart for two years.290 By comparison to grounds for
divorce in a "standard" marriage,29" ' divorce in a covenant marriage is more
difficult or more time consuming.
Although the grounds for divorce and separation from bed and board
superficially resemble the law in effect until 1979,292 significant differences
exist. First and foremost, physical or sexual abuse of a spouse or a child was
never grounds for divorce in Louisiana until 1997, and this conduct is grounds
for divorce only in a covenant marriage. In a "standard" marriage in Louisiana,
the victim of spousal abuse must seek a "no-fault" divorce based upon living
separate and apartfor six months. To refuse to pass judgment on this conduct
and to grant a "no-fault" judgment instead appears indefensible. The batterer
should be adjudged guilty of the act or acts of violence which society condemns
in a civil proceeding that permits proof by a simple preponderance of the
evidence. Furthermore, the battered spouse should not have to wait for six
months or longer, married to but separated from the abuser, if "reasonable" steps
were taken to preserve the marriage without success.293 Secondly, abandon-
ment before 1991 was simply a ground for legal separation and did not require
proof of a period of time during which the abandoning spouse constantly refused
to return. 294  Third, before repeal in 1991,291 there were eight grounds for
separation from bed and board based upon fault,296 grounds which had expand-
287. La. R.S. 9:307(A)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1998).
288. La. .S. 9:307(B)(6) (Supp. 1998).
289. La. R.S. 9:307(A)(6) (Supp. 1998).
290. La. R.S. 9:307(A)(5) (Supp. 1998).
291. La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103.
292. La. Civ. Code arts. 138, 139 (repealed Jan. 1, 1991); La. R.S. 9:301, 302 (1991) (repealed
Jan. 1, 1991). See Spaht, supra note 110, at 14649.
In 1979 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:301 was amended to permit a no-fault divorce when the
spouses have lived separate and apart for one year.
293. Often the period of time during which the spouses live separate and apart as required by
Louisiana Civil Code articles 102, 103, is the most dangerous time for an abused spouse. Passage
of the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act (La. R.S. 9:361-69 (Supp. 1998)) recognized the
post-separation period as a particularly vulnerable time period.
294. La. Civ. Code art. 138(5) (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
295. La. Civ. Code art. 138 (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
296. Louisiana Civil Code article 138 (effective before the 1979 legislative session)
included the following as grounds for separation from bed and board: adultery, conviction
of a felony and a sentence to imprisonment at hard labor or death, habitual intemperance
and cruel treatment that rendered the common life together insupportable, public defamation,
abandonment, attempt on the life of the other spouse, fleeing from justice after having been




ed to ten by adding two additional "no-fault" grounds.297 In a "covenant"
marriage there are only six grounds for separation from bed and board,2"
which do not include, for example, public defamation, an attempt on the life of
the other spouse, or intentional non-support of the other spouse who is in
destitute or necessitous circumstances.2" Fourth, a judgment of divorce after
legal separation required proof of having lived separate and apart for six months,
without regard to whether there were minor children of the marriage.3"
Covenant marriage legislation expresses unambiguously the legislature's concern
for the effect of divorce on children, a sentiment not so clearly communicated
by prior divorce law.
Because of the superficial similarities to the law of separation and divorce
in the 1970's, critics have argued that the covenant marriage legislation
"substantially replicates a version of the Louisiana divorce law that was in place
during the period when the divorce rate was increasing [1970s301]; its few
changes enhance the availability of speedy divorce. 0 2 It offers this regime
[covenant marriage] as an alternative to the civil code regime that has been in
place during a period of declining divorce rates."3°3 Divorce rates significantly
increased during the period of 1968-1979 principally because of the enactment
of easy "no-fault" divorce laws which "broke the dam" of pending domestic
cases.3 ' Professors Margaret Brinig and F.H. Buckley demonstrate in their
297. For a description of the unilateral and the mutual no-fault grounds for separation from bed
and board, see Spaht, supra note 110, at 148.
298. La. R.S. 9:307(BX1)-(6) (Supp. 1998).
299. See other grounds for separation from bed and board that existed before Jan. 1, 1991, in
supra note 296.
300. La. R.S. 9:302 (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
301. "The divorce rate had its sharpest rise in the United States from 1962 to the 1980s,
following a minor countertrend from 1950 to 1962... between 1968 and 1979, it rose to its highest
point, 5.3 divorces per 1000 people." Carriere, supra note 3, at 1721.
302. Id. The additional grounds for immediate divorce based upon fault added by covenant
marriage legislation are abandonment for one year and physical or sexual abuse of a spouse or child
of the parties.
303. Id.
304. "The claim of a causal relationship between the divorce rate and divorce law, except in the
extreme circumstance of a nationwide ban on divorce, is highly dubious." Id. Professor Carriere
cites as authority for this proposition, Ellman & Lohr, supra note 18, at 722-23. In Ellman & Lohr's
article the authors concentrate upon the methodology utilized by Brinig & Crafton, supra note 26,
to prove that "no-fault" divorce raises the opportunity costs of divorce for victims of spousal abuse.
Professor ElIman, who is also the Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute's project entitled
"Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution," is an outspoken critic of a restoration of objective
fault to the marital relationship. See ElIman's other articles cited in supra note 80.
Despite the claim that there is only an insignificant correlation between the enactment of"no-faulf'
divorce and divorce rates, at least two more recent articles demonstrate that there is such a
correlation. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 26 (no-fault divorce significantly increased divorce
rates because the costs of filing for divorce decreased; furthermore, higher divorce rates persisted in
no-fault states); Friedberg, supra note 26 (unilateral divorce raised divorce rates significantly; states
with more strongly unilateral divorce laws had greater increases in the divorce rates): "The rise in
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article No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People that even after the introduction of
"no-fault" laws higher divorce rates persisted in "no-fault" states. 305 Despite
assertions about Louisiana's divorce rate being only slightly less than the national
rate,3" 6 Louisiana is the only state which fails to report consistently the number
of divorces to the National Center for Health Statistics.3 7 That inability to
establish the divorce rate in Louisiana has created significant obstacles to the
current five-year empirical study of the effect of Louisiana's covenant marriage
legislation on the state's divorce rate .30  Even using old or unreliable Louisi-
ana divorce statistics, the phenomenon of a spike in the divorce rate during the
1970s can easily be explained as the result of almost universal enactment of easy
unilateral divorce in the 1970s.39 Furthermore, the level or slightly declining
national divorce rate occurring since the 1991 enactment of Louisiana's easier
divorce scheme ignores the alarming increase in cohabitation rates during the
same period of time. Cohabitant relationships terminate without affecting
divorce statistics."' The precipitous increase in cohabitation rates do not bode
the 1960's and 1970's looks especially stark compared to the low level in the 1950's, but it also was
steeper than the century-long trend." Id. at 608 n.2.
305. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 26.
306. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1721 (citing Kenneth J. Rigby, Alternative Dispute Resolution,
44 La. L. Rev. 1725, 1725-26 (1984) (citing in turn, C. Vetter, Child Custody: A New Direction
9 (1982)).
307. See tables in Friedberg, supra note 26, at 614, note b by Louisiana.
308. Steve Nack, sociology professor at the University of Virginia, is the director of the research
team conducting the study entitled, "Is Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law the Solution to America's
Divorce Problem?" The team includes Laura Sanchez and Jim Wright, sociology professors at
Tulane University.
The Gallup Organization began conducting the telephone survey in the summer of 1998 after the
questionnaire was designed by the team after consultation with an advisory committee larger in
number and with focus groups. The results were released in November: 63% agreed covenant
marriage will strengthen family life; 58% agreed that covenant marriage will be better for children;
59% agreed that covenant marriages will last longer; 95% agreed that divorce is a very or somewhat
serious problem (press release on file with author).
Another study of the effect of grass-roots politics utilizing the covenant marriage legislation as an
example is being conducted by Professor Katherine Rosier of Louisiana State University.
309. "During the past twenty years, the United States has experienced a period of rapid change
in the laws governing divorce. Touched off in 1969 by California's adoption of the nation's first
divorce code that dispensed entirely with traditional fault-based divorce grounds and completed in
1985 when South Dakota added a no-fault provision to its list of fault based grounds, the concept
that marriage failure is itself an adequate reason for marital dissolution has been accepted by every
state." Kay, supra note 61, at 6.
310. Gallagher, Whitehead, supra note 80.
Maggie Gallagher is, of course, not the only person drawing the connection. In the National
Weekly Edition of The Washington Times, (June 29-July 5, 1998) at 11, the paper reported on a
gathering at the Heritage Foundation:
American society must revive the institution of marriage, said Heritage Foundation
analyst Robert Rector.
The falling teen birthrates aren't as important as the leveling off of the "illegitimacy
ratio," or percent of births that occur out of wedlock each year, he said.
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well for our nation;s children whose best welfare, as has been observed
earlier,3 ' depends upon the traditional two-parent home where the biological
parents are committed to each other expressed through marriage.
Termination of a covenant marriage necessarily affects status; 31 2 termination
of a covenant marriage is not a matter governed by the principles of contract.
Section 274 of Title 9 imposes upon a "covenant" marriage33 the means of
termination of a "standard" marriage under Civil Code article 101.s'" Causes for
termination of a "standard" marriage are exclusive .3 " The judiciary has always
distinguished marriage from an ordinary contract3 6 as a relationship conferring
status.3"' Thus, speculation that a "covenant" marriage may be dissolved by
mutual consenet like an ordinary contract319 overlooks not only the provi-
sions of Section 274 but also those of Section 273 which instruct the counselor to
discuss: "... the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage
by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and board." '
For three decades, the percent of births born to women outside wedlock has grown
"remorselessly," charting the "collapse of the American family," he said.
"Women aged 18-25 still had the most babies," he said. "They just didn't many."
To capitalize on this trend, society should promote marriage as well as programs that
help couples build and retain healthy relationships and be good parents, said Mr. Rector.
See also Popence and Whitehead, supra note 21.
311. See supra discussion in text at notes 6-26.
312. See supra discussion in text at notes 261-266.
313. La. R.S. 9:274 (Supp. 1998): "A covenant marriage shall be governed by all of the
provisions of Chapters 1 through 4 of Title IV of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code and the
provisions of Code Title IV of Code Book I of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950."
Chapters 1-4 include: Chapter 1. Marriage. General Principles (La. Civ. Code arts. 86-93); Chapter
2. Nullity of Marriage (La. Civ. Code arts. 94-97); Chapter 3. Incidents and Effects of Marriage. (La.
Civ. Code arts. 98-100); Chapter 4. Termination of Marriage (La. Civ. Code art 101).
314. La. Civ. Code art. 101: "Marriage terminates upon: The death of either spouse. Divorce.
A judicial declaration of its nullity when the marriage is relatively null."
315. See Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 334 So. 2d 436, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.), and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
316. See Mason v. Mason, 399 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Stallings v. Stallings, 177
La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933); Hurry v. Hurry, 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1919).
317. La. Civ. Code art. 86. Marriage is a relationship although created by civil contract.
318. See the commentary by Professor William Crawford accompanying Prec. Form 361, in
Pleadings & Judicial Forms Ann. at 25: "The 'covenant' part of the covenant marriage, apart from
the C.C. art. 87 requirements, is a form of contract in addition to the C.C. 87 contract of marriage
and should not be viewed as a rule of public order.... If the covenant contract is not a rule of
public order, then that contract may be mutually rescinded by the parties to the covenant.
Furthermore, if the covenant were rescinded then the ordinary divorce procedures but not separation,
would be available to the parties ...... (emphasis added). Such a conclusion is not consistent with
the law of marriage or the provisions of the covenant marriage legislation.
319. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
320. La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). See also La. R.S. 9:273(A)(2)(b)




Louisiana's assertion of judicial jurisdiction 2 to render a separation from
bed and board in a covenant marriage is narrower than the state's assertion of
jurisdiction to divorce couples in either a "standard" or a covenant marriage.-m
For jurisdiction to render a legal separation, Louisiana requires that, in addition
to the Louisiana domicile of either plaintiff or defendant, the ground for
separation (i.e. adultery, abandonment, physical or sexual abuse) occurred in
Louisiana or while the matrimonial domicile was in Louisiana. 3z  To render
a divorce in either a "standard" or covenant marriage, the law only requires that
either the plaintiff or defendant be domiciled in Louisiana.3 " The restrictive
jurisdictional statute poses the historical issues of where does the abandonment
or the living separate and apart occur and when is the matrimonial domicile in
Louisiana.3 Even though the statutory assertion of jurisdiction is narrow, the
Revised Statute section also adopts the chivalrous notion of permitting a
"returning spouse" access to Louisiana courts if she was domiciled in
Louisiana prior to the time the cause of action occurred, the cause of
action occurred outside of Louisiana, and she is domiciled in Louisiana at the
time the action is filed . 2  This jurisdictional provision likewise had a prede-
cessor.
327
These two provisions asserting Louisiana'sjurisdiction in a separation action
seem unnecessarily restrictive and inconsistent with the policies of the covenant
marriage legislation. Ifjurisdiction in a separation action were coextensive with
jurisdiction to render a divorce, the law would provide more protection to the
"innocent" covenant spouse by providing greater access to Louisiana courts. The
"innocent" spouse to a covenant marriage should be permitted easy access to
Louisiana courts, especially for a legal separation, in an effort to assure
321. For a discussion of issues of interstatejurisdiction and conflict of laws, see supra discussion
in text at notes 261-279. These issues arise in the context of migratory divorce, where one spouse
to a "covenant" marriage in either Louisiana or Arizona travels to another state and seeks a divorce
under the law of the state of the spouse's new domicile.
The author addresses the issues of conflict of laws as relates to the status of the covenant couple
and those provisions of a covenant marriage that are contractual in greater depth in a forthcoming
article to be published in Creighton Lawv Review in 1999.
For a discussion of issues of migratory divorce, see Carriere, supra note 3, at 1731-43.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 3522, cmtL (d): "Thus, to equate jurisdiction with choice of law with
regard to that issue [right to divorce], as is done in Article 3521, seems to be not only acceptable but
also efficient."
322. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(A)(7) (divorce); La. RIS. 9:308(B) (Supp. 1998) (separation from
bed and board). See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941 (venue for divorce); La. R.S. 9:308(BX2)
(1997).
323. La. R.S. 9:308(B)(1)(a) (Supp. 1998).
324. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10(A)(7). See also id. art. 10(B).
325. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:308(BX1) (Supp. 1998) which narrowly confers jurisdiction
to Louisiana to render a separation in a covenant marriage bears a striking resemblance to the
language of the Code of Civil Procedure prior to its amendment in 1990.
326. La. R.S. 9:308(B)(1)(b) (Supp. 1998).
327. La. Civ. Code art. 142 (repealed 1990).
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enforcement of the contractual provisions of her covenant marriage. Assurance
comes in the form of guaranteed application of Louisiana law,3 2 especially
since Louisiana would have personal jurisdiction over the absent covenant
spouse. 29 No court in another state would be as well equipped to interpret and
apply the Louisiana law of covenant marriage. As importantly, it is illogical to
restrict access to a legal separation in instances where access to divorce
is not so restricted. Louisiana's assertion of jurisdiction, if it is to be
consistent with the overall policy of covenant marriage, should encourage
separation from bed and board, which preserves the marriage, in preference to
divorce.
A. Fault Grounds for Legal Separation or Divorce
1. Adultery and Conviction of a Felony
A spouse in a "covenant" marriage, just as in a "standard" marriage, may
seek a divorce for the other spouse's adultery or conviction of a felony3 if the
sentence imposed is imprisonment at hard labor or death.' Adultery, defined
in the cases to include at the least oral sex 32 as well as sexual intercourse with
penetration, has always been considered the most serious violation of a spouse's
marital obligations.33 3 The possibility of the wife's adultery introducing a
"bastard" into the husband's blood line"" in combination with the sharing of
one's sexual potential as an expression of the deepest human intimacy made
adultery the most reprehensible of conduct within the marital relationship. The
jurisprudence interpreting the meaning of commission of a felony3 5 will apply,
328. This issue as well as other conflict of laws issues will be addressed in the author's
article to be published in Creighton Law Review, forthcoming in 1999. The effects of a
Louisiana covenant marriage litigated in a Louisiana court will be determined by Louisiana
law. It is far better for the effects of a covenant marriage to be determined in Louisiana
by a Louisiana court more familiar with the legislation and the policies favoring its
enactment.
329. La. R.S. 13:3201(B) (1987), as amended by 1998 La. Acts No. 273, § i. See supra
discussion in text at notes 261-279.
330. La. Civ. Code arts. 103(2), (3).
331. La. R.S. 9:307(AXI), (2) (Supp. 1998) (covenant marriage); La. Civ. Code art. 103
("standard" marriage). The spouse in a "covenant' marriage may also seek a separation from bed
and board, rather than a divorce, for the same reasons. La. R.S. 9:307(B)(1), (2) (Supp. 1998). See
supra discussion in text at notes 298-299.
332. See Menge v. Menge, 491 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Alphonso v. Alphonso, 422
So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982). See also Bonura v. Bonura, 505 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1987).
333. La. Civ. Code art. 98 (spouses owe each otherfidelity, support and assistance).
334. See Katherine Shaw Spaht and William Marshall Shaw, Jr., The Strongest Presumption
Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 La. L. Rev. 59
(1976).
335. La. Civ. Code art. 103.
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of course, to the identical ground for divorce or separation from bed and board
in a "covenant" marriage. 6
2. Abandonment for One Year
Abandonment, once grounds for a legal separation in Louisiana 37 and still
relevant for purposes of final periodic support,33 requires evidence that a
spouse has left the matrimonial domicile, without lawful cause, and "constantly
refuses to return., 339  Jurisprudence recognized that abandonment could be
"constructive" without the necessity of a spouse "quitting" the matrimonial
domicile. For example, if he changed the locks on the doors of the matrimonial
domicile or otherwise prevented the other spouse from entering, the judiciary
recognized that the action constituted a "constructive" abandonment.340
Ordinarily, proving a spouse left the matrimonial domicile is not difficult. The
issue that proves the most troublesome is whether the spouse left "without lawful
cause." Although the jurisprudence is not entirely consistent,34' courts general-
ly permit proof of a constant refusal to return by evidence that the other spouse
has not returned prior to the divorce or separation litigation. 42
Lawful cause to leave which precludes the offense of abandonment includes
proof that the spouses' agreed to live separate and apart even if that agreement
is implied from conduct,34 or that the spouse who remained at the matrimonial
domicile was guilty of fault justifying the departure of the other spouse. 44
336. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 480 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Nickels v. Nickels,
347 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
337. La. Civ. Code art. 138(5) (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
338. La. Civ. Code art. 11. See, e.g., Brehm v. Brehm, 685 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1996), writ denied, 688 So. 2d 505 (La. 1997); Mercer v. Mercer, 671 So. 2d 937 La. App. 3d Cir.
1996); Harrington v. Montet, 634 So. 2d 1302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
339. La. R.S. 9:307(A)(3) (Supp. 1998). See also La. R.S. 9:307(B)(3) (Supp. 1998).
340. Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So. 2d 826 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
341. See, e-g., Von Bechman v. Von Bechman, 386 So. 2d 910 (La. 1980); Bell v. Magee, 406
So. 2d 717 (La.'App. 4th Cir. 1981) and discussion in text at infra notes 350-355.
342. See Gipson v. Gipson, 536 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). "Indeed, some
decisions seem to require of the plaintiff only that he prove (1) the defendant's departure
(2) without cause, and not (3) that he made any effort to urge the defendant to return to
the common dwelling. See, eg.. Beck v. Beck, 341 So.2d 580 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
Indeed, it seems these decisions impose upon the defendant the duty to return at least before
trial of the issue of abandonment begins, if not by the time of the initiation of the suit
against him." Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course by Robert Anthony
Pascal 143-44 (4th ed. 1986).
343. For example, Mercer v. Mercer, 671 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996). However, a
strong argument can be made that the court should be reluctant in a "covenant" marriage to find that
lawful cause includes an agreement to separate on the basis of conduct. See also Broussard v.
Broussard, 462 So. 2d 1386 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (agreement was voluntary).
344. See. eg., Bruce v. Bruce, 696 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Brehm v. Brehm, 685
So. 2d 377 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996), writ denied, 688 So. 2d 505 (1997); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 672
So. 2d 944 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1351 (1996); Harrington v. Montet, 634 So.
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Fault in a "standard" marriage that justifies one spouse's departure from the
matrimonial domicile is conduct that constitutes grounds for legal separation or
divorce prior to January 1, 19 9 1,34s the same definition of fault for purposes
of final spousal support. 46 In a "covenant" marriage fault that constitutes
lawful cause should consist of grounds for a legal separation or divorce in a
"covenant" marriage-such as adultery, commission of a felony, physical or
sexual abuse of the spouse or a child of the parties, habitual intemperance or
cruel treatment that renders their common life together insupportable.347 In
effect for a "covenant" marriage,fault for purposes of lawful cause to abandon
a spouse, has been redefined with the identical contours of separation or divorce
grounds in a "covenant" marriage. To the extent that additional grounds for
separation existed prior to January 1, 1991,'"s and do not fall under the rubric
of cruel treatment,349 they are not "lawful cause" for abandonment in a
"covenant" marriage.
Unlike the prior ground for separation, abandonment in a "covenant"
marriage must exist for a one-year period."' As a consequence, the third
element of abandonment, "has constantly refused to return," should be easier to
prove, at least its constancy. However, what may be more difficult to prove, in
a conscious departure from prior jurisprudence, is that the other spouse has
constantly refused to return during the entire one-year period. Refusal implies
a request, or at the very least a demonstrated willingness to receive the
abandoning spouse into the matrimonial domicile. Prior to 1958 this refusal was
2d 1302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Skannal v. Skannal, 631 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 637 So. 2d 1067 (1994).
For an excellent discussion of the conflict in circuit courts of appeal in the early 1980s about the
meaning of "lawful cause", see Durand v. Willis, 470 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985). Some
cases appear to accept as proof of lawful cause conduct that is less serious than the conduct required
to obtain a separation or divorce.
345. The grounds for a separation from bed and board before January 1, 1991, are listed in
supra note 296.
346. See. &g., Adams v. Adams, 389 So. 2d 381 (La. 1980); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 672 So. 2d
944 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1351 (1996).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 11l, cmt. (c).
347. La. I.S. 9:307(A), (B) (Supp. 1998).
348. La. Civ. Code art. 138 (repealed Jan. 1, 1991). See discussion in text at supra notes 295-
299. In fact three of the fault grounds for separation before Jan. 1, 1991, which were omitted in the
covenant marriage legislation, could be cruel treatment.
349. Public defamation, attempting to kill the other spouse, and intentional nonsupport of a
spouse in destitute or necessitous circumstances would in the ordinary case be considered cruel
treatment. If such conduct rendered the life together insupportable, it would be grounds for a
separation from bed and board in a "covenant'' marriage. See La. R.S. 9:307(B)(6) (Supp. 1998).
If a spouse was charged with a felony and fled from justice, prior to January 1, 1991, the other
spouse was entitled to a separation. Whether or not the circumstances of being charged with a felony
and fleeing from justice falls under the rubric of cruel treatment will determine if all previously
existing grounds for separation are incorporated in lawful cause for the purposes of abandonment in
a "covenant" marriage.
350. La. %.S. 9:307(AX3), (BX3) (Supp. 1998).
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proved by a judicial summons directed to the abandoning spouse and his failure
to obey the summons by returning to the matrimonial domicile.3"' Thereafter,
the legislation permitted proof of abandonment "as any other fact in a civil
suit."" 2 This change led to some judicial decisions "running counter to the
historic purpose of the suit for abandonment,"5 3 which was "more an effort to
have the errant spouse return and renew the conjugal life than to put an official
end to it.53 4 With the enactment of "covenant" marriage legislation, the object
of which is to strengthen marriage by counseling and a more difficult and time-
consuming divorce process, abandonment for the first time in Louisiana became
a ground for divorce but only if it lasted for a period of one year. Considering
the purpose of the legislation and the seriousness with which abandonment is
treated, the judiciary should require proof of a request by the abandoned spouse
and then a failure to return by the other. s Furthermore, constancy within the
one-year period implies more than one request for the other spouse's return and
the last such request within a reasonable time immediately prior to the expiration
of the one year period.
During the one-year period of abandonment while the spouses are physically
living apart, either spouse may seek limited incidental relief: child custody, child
support and spousal support. 6 The same criteria apply to the granting of such
incidental relief as apply to their award pending separation or divorce." 7 Thus,
a court considering a request for spousal support during this period should apply
the criteria for the award of interim spousal support: "the needs" of the claimant
spouse, the "ability of the other party to pay, and the standard of living of the
parties during the marriage.3 53" The award of spousal support while the couple
is physically separated serves the same purpose as an interim award-"to
maintain the status quo without unnecessary economic dislocation....
Other incidental relief that may be requested by a spouse in a proceeding for
351. See Spaht, supra note 342, at 143-44.
352. Former La. Civ. Code art. 145 (repealed Jan. I, 1991).
353. Spaht, supra note 342, at 143.
354. Id.
355. Samuel, supra note 4: "But when a couple has voluntarily chosen a strict regime of divorce
after premarital counseling on the subject, there is no justification for the lawyer or judge to
manipulate or allow manipulation of the law or evidence to effect a divorce for such a couple...
See also Green v. Green, 567 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
356. La. RIS. 9:308(D) (Supp. 1998). See Chi v. Pang, 643 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994)
(interpreting parallel La. RS 9:291 (1990)).
357. La. RIS. 9:308(D) (Supp. 1998) (covenant marriage); La. Civ. Code art. 105 ("standard"
marriage).
358. La. Civ. Code art. 113. See also La. Civ. Code art. 111.
359. La. Civ. Code art. 113, cmt. (b): "Generally, the same purpose was attributed to alimony
pendente lite under former Civil Code Article II1 by the court in Arrendell v. Arrendell, 390 So.2d
927, 930 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980): '(I)t is designed to preserve and continue the status quo insofar
as maintenance and support are concerned. It relates to facts as they have existed during the time
the parties were living together and as they actually exist at the time the litigation commences, not
to future possibilities and capabilities."'
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divorce"' or separation36' but which is not explicitly available before filing
suit includes special injunctive relief,362 except for an injunction in family
violence cases;"' use and occupancy of the family home or use of community
movables or immovables;3 ' or use of personal property.36 During the one-
year period the community of acquets and gains continues to exist. However,
either spouse may seek a judgment of separation of property after the couple has
been physically separated for six months;366 the judgment terminates the
community regime."
3. Physical or Sexual Abuse of a Spouse or Child of the Parties
For the first time in Louisiana history physical or sexual abuse of a spouse
or a child of the parties, which includes children who are not children of the
marriage, is a ground for divorce but only in a covenant marriage.' 9
Before January 1, 1991, a spouse could obtain a separation from bed and board
for cruel treatment which always included physical cruelty toward a spouse as
long as the cruelty rendered the common life together insupportable. Cruelty by
a spouse directed at a child of the parties if in the presence of the offended
360. La. Civ. Code art. 105 ("standard" marriage); La. R.S. 9:308(D) (Supp. 1998) ("covenant"
marriage).
361. La. R.S. 9:308(D) (Supp. 1998).
362. La. R.S. 9:371 (1990), 9:372 (1997). See Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 3944,
3604 for examples of the special nature of this injunctive relief.
Nothing precludes a spouse from seeking general injunctive relief under Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3601, or protective orders under Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2136.
363. La. R.S. 9:366 (1995): "All separation, divorce, child custody, and child visitation orders
and judgments in family violence cases shall contain an injunction as defined in R.S. 9:362. Any
violation of the injunction, if proved by the appropriate standard, shall be punished as contempt of
court, and shall result in a termination of all court ordered child visitation." (emphasis added).
For the definition of family violence, see La. R.S. 9:362(3) (Supp. 1998).
364. La. R.S. 9:374 (1997).
365. La. R.S. 9:373 (1990).
366. La. Civ. Code art. 2374(D): "When the spouses have lived separate and apart continuously
for a period of six months, a judgment decreeing separation of property shall be granted on the
petition of either spouse." Id. art. 2356: "The legal regime of community property is terminated by
... judgment of ... separation of property...."
This remedy assumes, of course, that other grounds for separation of property do not exist, such
as mismanagement of community property. See La. Civ. Code art. 2374(A).
367. La. Civ. Code art. 2356.
368. The term clearly includes stepchildren of the spouse who is guilty of physical or sexual
abuse. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-903 (4) (West 1998), which makes physical or sexual abuse
of any child or relative of either spouse permanently living in the matrimonial domicile grounds for
divorce in a covenant marriage.
369. La. R.S. 9:307(A)(4) (Supp. 1998). See also the relaxation of grounds for divorce after
legal separation when there are minor children of the marriage if abuse of a child was the basis for
the legal separation (La. R.S. 9:307(B)(4) (Supp. 1998)). Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:307(A)(6)(b)
(Supp. 1998) reduces the period of time in such case from one year and six months to one year.
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spouse also constituted cruel treatment since the presence of the offended spouse
meant it was intended to harm her. By comparison, the covenant marriage
legislation expanded the offensive conduct to include sexual or physical abuse of
the child without requiring that the abuse be in the presence of the other spouse.
In addition the legislation elevated the seriousness of the societal offense 70 to
a ground for divorce. What a mockery the law makes of divorce from the abuser
in a "standard" marriage by pronouncing that the breakup of the marriage was
no one's fault.3 ' The abused spouse in a covenant marriage need not wait 180
days or six months to seek a divorce but can file for a divorce immediately
72
with the concomitant societal judgment about the abuser's conduct.
Physical and sexual abuse are terms used in the Post-Separation Family
Violence Relief Act as part of the definition of "family violence. 37 3 The
definition of "family violence" under the Act explicitly includes acts beyond
physical or sexual abuse, such as any offense against the person,374 but also
clarifies that the term does not include "reasonable acts of self-defense utilized
by one parent to protect himself or herself or a child in the family from the
family violence of the other parent. 3 75 Louisiana courts have had occasion to
interpret the meaning of "sexual abuse," which includes touching a child in her
vaginal area,3 76 encouraging the child to touch and kiss the adult in the groin
area, 3" and penetration evidenced by adhesions of the hymen discovered during
370. See La. R.S. 9:361 (Supp. 1998) and La. R.S. 46:2121,2131 (1982) as expressions by the
legislature of the condemnation of such conduct within the marital relationship or at its termination.
La. R.S. 9:361 (Supp. 1998) was enacted in 1992. (1992 La. Acts No. 1091, § 1).
371. La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103(1). Even Professor Carriere in a footnote in her article,
Carriere, supra note 3, at 1714 n.80 states: "It is difficult to understand the logic by which assigning
blame to a party dissatisfied with her or his marriage is viewed as a means of preventing marital
breakdown; it seems that it would supply an added source of grievance and an added impetus to end
the marriage. Of course, if the blame is deserved, as in the case of a battering spouse, then such a
result ... could benefit both the victim and society." (emphasis added).
372. Proof of physical or sexual abuse in a civil proceeding for divorce need be by a simple
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecution
of the abuser. For a recent example, see Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 668 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1996) (for purposes of alimony, court found husband had slapped wife despite fact he was
acquitted on assault charge).
373. La. R.S. 9:362(3) (Supp. 1998).
374. Id.: "'Family violence' includes but is not limited to physical or sexual abuse and any
offense against the person as defined in the Criminal Code of Louisiana, except negligent injuring
and defamation, committed by one parent against the other parent or against any of the children."
375. La. R.S. 9:362(3) (Supp. 1998).
376. See Bearden v. Bearden, 645 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (daughter described to
mother that father had touched her and demonstrated by placing her finger inside both her vaginal
and anal regions); State Dep't of Social Services in the Interest of A.D., C.D., & D.D., 628 So. 2d
1288, 1293 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (one daughter admitted to "vague, nonspecific sexual contace
but the other indicated to the court that her father touched her in the vaginal area).
377. Kiefer v. Yellon, 646 So. 2d 1073 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (conduct also included father's
rubbing his penis on child until ejaculation).
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physical examination.378  "Physical abuse" includes striking a spouse in the
face; 379 pushing, punching, shoving, biting, or kicking a spouse; 30 throwing
water in spouse's face and then throwing her to the floor;381 grabbing a spouse
by the neck and choking her;382 grabbing a spouse's hair and banging her head
against the inside of a car;383 putting a gun in a spouse's face and threatening
to kill her;3 4 and severely shaking and whipping a child which leaves bruis-
es.
385
Broader notions of objective fault as grounds for divorce restore a higher
standard of morality in conduct within the marital relationship.386 Although
far more incidents of violence occur in non-marital relationships, 37 a covenant
marriage makes the abuser legally accountable to society. Covenant marriage
restores on behalf of society a standard of morality within the marital relation-
ship which society is willing to apply to the conduct of married partners.
Covenant marriage not only condemns certain marital misbehavior but also
admonishes a couple that only the strongest reasons justify termination of the
marriage, particularly if there are children. Communicating society's ideal in the
form of a choice can only strengthen the cultural perception of marriage and
perhaps save it from extinction. "
4. Cruelty (Mental) and Habitual Intemperance as Grounds for Legal
Separation Only
Unlike Arizona,8 9 Louisiana covenant marriage legislation limits cruel
treatment, other than physical or sexual abuse, to grounds for separation upon
proof that the cruelty in question renders the spouses' life together insupport-
378. Id.
379. Michelli v. Michelli, 655 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
380. Id. See also Morrison v. Morrison, 699 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
381. Id.
382. Id. See also Morrison v. Morrison, 699 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
383. Id.
384. Morrison v. Morrison, 699 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
385. Evans v. Terrell, 665 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995), writ denied, 672 So. 2d (1996),
appeal after remand, 714 So. 2d 914 (1998) (there was also a bum mark on the back of the child's
hand).
386. See Schneider, supra note 26, at 503; Brinig & Buckley, supra note 26; Brinig & Crafton,
supra note 26.
387. See Fagan et al., supra note 8.
388. See Gallagher, Whitehead, supra note 80; Popenoe and Whitehead, supra note 21.
See also Brinig, supra note 6, at 4 (the precommitment made in Louisiana covenant marriage
would lead, like other bonding devices to better later choices); Scott and Scott, supra note 18
(covenant marriage should lead to greater investment in the sorts of things that make marriages better
but that arc bad investments in the less permanent world of no-fault).
389. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-903(4) (West 1998) (emotional abuse grounds for divorce in covenant
marriage).
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able. 9  The legislation, just as its predecessor,"' includes "excesses," "out-
rages," and "ill-treatment" '392 in addition to cruel treatment. All such conduct
was aggregated under the rubric mental cruelty. A survey of cases interpreting
the terms393 reveals that mental cruelty can include the refusal of sexual rela-
tions394 or sexual excess,395 failure to adequately perform housecleaning and
the preparation of meals,396 religious fervor and constant proselytizing,
397
harassment beyond mere nagging and griping,39 serious monetary irresponsibil-
ity,399 or an accumulation of such offenses." ° Intemperance clearly refers
to alcohol' 0 ' and drug use, whether stimulants or depressants,0 2 which if
habitual, constant and repetitive rather than intermittent or isolated, may also be
grounds for a separation from bed and board.
In either case, however, the cruelty or habitual intemperance must be such
that it renders the common life together insupportable. The requirement that the
offensive conduct render the life together insupportable introduces a subjective
factor intended to focus attention on the sensibilities of the offended spouse and
the social milieu of the couple. The measure of insupportability should not be
the same for all persons; for the same act will render the common life insupport-
390. La. R.S. 9:307(B)(6) (Supp. 1998).
391. La. Civ. Code art. 138(3) (repealed Jan. 1, 1991).
392. Id.: "On account of habitual intemperance of one of the married persons, or excesses, cruel
treatment, or outrages of one of them toward the other, if such habitual intemperance, or such ill-
treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable."
393. One such excellent survey although now dated was James F. Pierson, Jr., The Degree of
Cruelty Necessary to Justf Separation from Bed and Board in Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. 533
(1956), which considered the meaning of the terms for purposes of the ground for separation from
bed and board.
Cases are still decided interpreting the terns for purposes of determining fault under Louisiana
Civil Code article I I I (final periodic spousal support).
394. Wagner v. Wagner, 686 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996), writ denied, 692 So. 2d 394,
399 (1997); Shenk v. Shenk, 563 So. 2d 1000 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Phillpott v. Phillpott, 285
So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 288 So. 2d 643 (1974).
395. See Von Bechman v. Von Bechman, 386 So. 2d 910 (La. 1980); Mudd v. Mudd, 206 La.
1055, 20 So. 2d 311 (1944).
396. See Lamb v. Lamb, 460 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 1249,
1250 (1985) (because of couple's financial ability to afford a maid, wife's ineptitude in cleaning and
preparing meals not fault).
397. Daigle v. Breaux, 477 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
398. Minella v. Minella, 713 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998); Roussel v. Roussel, 688 So.
2d 160 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Wagner v. Wagner, 686 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996), writ
denied, 692 So. 2d 394, 399 (1997); Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So. 2d 826 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
399. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359 (La. 1994), on remand, 653 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 660 So. 2d 853 (1995) (proof insufficient because of mitigating circumstances, reversed
and remanded). But see Butts v. Butts, 426 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
400. See. e.g., Simon v. Simon, 696 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997).
401. Michelli v. Michelli, 655 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. lstCir. 1995); Roland v. Roland, 519 So.
2d 1177 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987). There may be a question as to whether a gambling addiction is
habitual intemperance or cruel treatment. See Olivier v. Abunza, 266 La. 456, 76 So. 2d 528 (1954).
402. Crifasi v. Crifasi, 650 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
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able for some couples, but not for others. 3 Each case should be considered
on its own merits, but this individualization of cases "must not be made a basis
for abusing the law through laxity in its application."' The court "should use
extreme prudence, having due regard for the possibility of the continuance of the
spouses' life in common,"4"5 particularly since the marriage is a covenant
marriage voluntarily chosen by the spouses.'"
5. Grounds for Divorce After a Legal Separation
An "innocent" spouse may choose to seek a separation from bed and board
rather than a divorce4 7 for reasons as various as religious conviction or the
desire to maintain spousal support at a higher level. 0 8 Should a spouse choose
to obtain a separation from bed and board the length of time that must elapse
between the judgment of separation from bed and board and the divorce differs
depending upon whether there are minor children of the marriage.0 9 If there
are minor children of the marriage, as a general rule, the spouses must live
separate and apart for one year and six months after the legal separation410
before either spouse may file suit for divorce.4" By contrast, if there are no
minor children of the marriage, the spouses need live separate and apart for only
one year after the legal separation before either may file for divorce.42 The
403. See, eg., Spansenberg v. Carter, 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673 (1922); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
215 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
404. Spaht, supra note 342, at 142.
405. Id.
406. See Samuel, supra note 4, at n.20.
407. The grounds for divorce in a covenant marriage are almost identical to those for a
separation from bed and board. The only difference is that habitual intemperance or cruel treatment
that renders the common life together insupportable is only a ground for legal separation. Seesupra
discussion in text at notes 389-390.
408. La. Civ. Code art. 113: "the court may award a party an interim periodic allowance based
on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to pay, and the standard of living of the
parties during the marriage. The obligation to pay interim periodic support shall not extend beyond
one hundred eighty days from the rendition of the judgment of divorce, except for good cause
shown." (emphasis added).
The negative inference is that the interim allowance terminates with divorce unless it is extended,
which is consistent with the predecessor to Article 113, Article 148 (repealed Jan. 1, 1998). See
Wascom v. Wascom, 691 So. 2d 678 (La. 1997), appeal afler remand, 713 So. 2d 1271 (1998).
Article 148 permitted a recipient to receive alimony pendente lite subject to the criteria in that article
until a divorce judgment was rendered. The criteria in Article 148 (repealed Jan. 1, 1998) and
Article 113 permit the award of a larger sum than the application of the criteria for alimony after
divorce, now final spousal support. See La. Civ. Code arts. 111, 112.
409. La. R.S. 9:307(AX6)(b) (Supp. 1998).
410. Accurately described in the legislation as one year and six months "from the date thejudgment of separation from bed and board was signed." La. R.S. 9:307(AX6Xa) (Supp. 1998). To
the same effect, see identical phraseology in La. R.S. 9:307(AX6)(b) (Supp. 1998).
411. La. R.S. 9:307(AX6)(b) (Supp. 1998).
412. La. R.S. 9:307(AX6Xa) (Supp. 1998).
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distinction in grounds for divorce after a legal separation emphasizes the
existence of minor children of the marriage, supporting the claim that covenant
marriage legislation was "for the sake of the children." '413 In troubled marriag-
es where there are children of the marriage, "slowing down" the process of
divorce in an effort to permit steps to be taken is a realistic response if the goal
is to preserve the covenant marriage.4t4 If there are no minor children of the
marriage, the legislature lacks the compelling concern to preserve the marriage
that it has if there are such children.
Despite the obvious concern for the preservation of a covenant marriage
when there are minor children, there is an exception to the slowdown if "abuse
of a child [need not be child of the marriage4 5] is the basis for which the
judgment of separation from bed and board was obtained... ."4 6 If abuse of
a child was the ground for legal separation,4 " then the threat posed to the child
by the additional six-month period outweighs the policy permitting more time for
the spouses to take steps to preserve the marriage. The focus of the covenant
marriage legislation remains on the child of the marriage: preserve the marriage
for the sake of the child unless the marriage poses an actual, realistic threat to
the safety and psychological health of the child.
6. Defenses:18 Recrimination and Comparative Rectitude
The introductory section of the legislation describing a covenant marriage
declares that "[o]nly when there has been a complete and total breach of the
413. See supra authorities cited in note 9.
414. Proponents of covenant marriage hope that the two year period will be long enough
to effect a reconciliation by giving counseling an opportunity to succeed, or if
reconciliation is impossible, will be long enough to force the spouse who wants an
immediate divorce to offer an adequate financial inducement to the innocent spouse to sue
for an immediate divorce should the innocent spouse have grounds for such a divorce....
Samuel, supra note 4.
415. "a child of the marriage or a child of one of the spouses... ." La. R.S. 9:307(A)(6)(b)
(Supp. 1998).
416. Id.
417. La. R.S. 9:307(BX4) (Supp. 1998).
418. The defense of reconciliation should be available to covenant spouses although the defense
does not appear in a form identical to Louisiana Civil Code article 104: "The cause of action for
divorce is extinguished by the reconciliation of the parties." Furthermore, Article 104 is excluded
from the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:274 that provides a covenant marriage shall be
governed by certain chapters of the Civil Code Title IV which apply to "standard" marriages. Article
104 appears in Title V of Book I. Nonetheless, reconciliation is mentioned specifically in La. R.S.
9:307(A)(5) (Supp. 1998) (living separate and apart for two years without reconciliation); La. R.S.
9:307(A)(6Xa) and (b) (Supp. 1998) (one year or one year and six months living separate and apart
without reconciliation after a judgment of separation); La. R.S. 9:307(BX5) (Supp. 1998) (same as
La. R.S. 9:307(A)(5) (Supp. 1998)); La. R.S. 9:309(A)(2) (Supp. 1998) (status ofjudicially separated
covenant spouses until reconciliation); La. R.S. 9:309(B)(2) (Supp. 1998) (community property
regime reestablished upon reconciliation). Living separate and apart because the fault of one spouse
has offended the other spouse is analogous to living separate and apart because of a judgment of
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marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching party seek a declaration
that the marriage is no longer legally recognized."4 9 This general definition
of an element of covenant marriage, grounds for termination, is modified by the
more specific provisions that thereafter govern divorce in a covenant mar-
riage.42 For example, the sentence begins by stating that "[o]nly when there
has been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant.. . ." may the non-
breaching party seek relief. However, the more specific provision that governs
divorce in a covenant marriage permits a spouse to obtain a divorce if the
spouses have been living separate and apart for two years,42' which does not
involve a complete and total breach of the marital covenant by one spouse."'
As a general rule of interpretation, the more specific provision prevails if there
is a conflict; but in this instance the more specific section prevails because it
begins with "[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary....,,2 The
explanation for the discrepancy in definition and the more specific section on
grounds for divorce lies in the legislative history: the bill as introduced
contained only two grounds for an immediate divorce in a covenant marriage,
both of which (adultery and abandonment for one year) involve a complete and
total breach of a spouse's marital obligations.424
Adultery and abandonment, however, are not the only grounds for an
immediate divorce under the covenant marriage legislation which represent a
separation from bed and board. La. R.S. 9:309(A)(2) (Supp. 1998). Consistently with the spirit of
a covenant marriage reflected in all of the statutory provisions governing its creation and existence,
the offended spouse may terminate the marriage for reasons of fault on the part of the other spouse.
If the spouse is no longer offended because he or she has forgiven the offense by the other,
reconciliation should be a defense to an action to terminate a covenant marriage for fault.
The defense of excuse due to mental or emotional illness is probably available, although the
defense itself created by the judiciary at the height of Americans' acceptance of psychological
excuses for offensive behavior ought to be reexamined. See Brehm v. Brehm, 685 So. 2d 377 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1996), writ denied, 688 So. 2d 505 (1997); Doane v. Benenate, 671 So. 2d 523 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1996).
419. La. R.S. 9:272(A) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
420. For a related discussion, see supra text at notes 185-186, 312-320.
421. La. &.S. 9:307(A)(5) (Supp. 1998).
422. The obligations of the marital covenant include fidelity, support and assistance. La. Civ.
Code art 98. Living separate and apart does not expressly violate the obligations of fidelity, support
and assistance. In fact, comment (f) to Article 98 addresses the spouses' obligation to live together.
"Under this revision the spouses are free to live together as necessary to fulfill their obligation
mutually to support, assist, and be faithful to each other."
Living separate and apart as a grounds for divorce contemplates an agreement by the spouses to
live apart, or two spouses guilty of a total breach of marital obligations, so that neither or both can
be accused of violating the obligation contained in Article 98, such as the positive obligation of
fidelity (to share one's sexual potential with the other) or the obligation of assistance (to assist each
other in cooperative endeavors of married life). Living separate and apart is to be distinguished from
abandonment which does involve a breach of the obligation to live together so as to fulfill the
obligations of fidelity and assistance.
423. La. R.S. 9:307(A) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
424. See Carriere, supra note 3, at 1715 n.91; Samuel, supra note 4.
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spouse's total breach of his marital obligations. Conviction of a felony and
physical and sexual abuse also involve conduct that constitutes a complete and
total breach of one's marital obligations. Thus, the four "fault" grounds for an
immediate divorce ultimately included in the covenant marriage legislation or the
additional "fault" ground for a legal separation425 concern a spouse's conduct
that breaches his marital obligations. For the offenses that constitute "fault," the
more specific provision is consistent with the general definition: only the non-
breaching party may seek legal relief.4 .6 So what happens if both parties have
engaged in conduct that constitutes "fault" grounds for separation and divorce
and thus breached their marital obligations?
The query raises the possibility of the familiar defense of recrimination and
the ameliorating principle, comparative rectitude. Recrimination as a judicially
recognized defense was derived from the underlying principle of the law of
separation and divorce that relief was available only to the offended spouse.427
Recrimination "had no role, and was not invoked, in a suit for separation or
divorce based on living separate and apart."42  If invoked by the defendant as
a defense to a suit for separation or divorce by the plaintiff, the defendant had
to prove "fault" by the plaintiff. To be successful the defendant had to prove not
only the "fault" of the plaintiff, but also the degree of seriousness of plaintiffs
"fault." If the defendant was successful in proving that plaintiff was at "fault"
and that plaintiffs "fault" was equal to that of his, then plaintiffs suit was
dismissed. The result, of course, of a successful invocation of the defense was
that neither spouse could obtain a separation or divorce for "fault" of the other.
If the defendant could not prove that the "fault" of the plaintiff was equal to or
greater in degree than his own," then plaintiff prevailed and was entitled to
a judgment.430 Even if the defendant was successful and plaintiffs suit was
425. Habitual intemperance and cruel treatment that renders the common life together
insupportable. La. RIS. 9:307(B)(6) (Supp. 1998).
426. La. &S. 9:307(A)(1) (Supp. 1998): "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and
subsequent to the parties obtaining counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a
judgment of divorce only upon proof of... : (1) The other spouse has committed adultery...."
(emphasis added). See also La. R.S. 9:307(A)(2)-(4) (Supp. 1998) and 9:307(BXI)-(4), (5) (Supp.
1998).
427. "For instances in which the doctrine of recrimination was applied, see J.F.C v. ME., 6
Rob. 135 (1843); Maranto v. Maranto, 297 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); and Schillaci v.
Schillaci, 310 So.2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975)." Spaht, supra note 110, at 203.
See also Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557 So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d
1379 (1990).
428. Spaht, supra note 110, at 203.
429. The most obvious example of a proper invocation of comparative rectitude is when one
spouse has been guilty of habitual intemperance or cruel treatment which are only grounds for legal
separation (see supra discussion in text at notes 389-406) and the other, guilty of grounds for divorce,
such as physical or sexual abuse or adultery.
430. "If the offenses were of entirely different orders of degrees of seriousness, the spouse guilty
of the lesser fault was entitled to relief by invoking the principle of comparative rectitude. Eals v.
Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409 (1952). The obvious purpose of comparative rectitude was to
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dismissed, either spouse could thereafter seek a "no-fault" divorce after living
separate and apart for the requisite period of time.
The defense of recrimination with its corollary principle of comparative
rectitude was legislatively overruled in separation actions43' and judicially
overruled in divorce suits. 3" Does the definition of a covenant marriage
resurrect the defense of recrimination in a suit for divorce by a covenant spouse?
What effect would its resurrection have on the covenant couple? If additional
fault grounds for divorce had simply been added to the list of grounds for
divorce in a "standard" marriage under Civil Code article 103, a strong argument
could be made that the jurisprudence had abolished the defense. However, by
creating a new tier, or type, of marriage that emphasizes relief exclusively for the
"innocent" spouse, the legislature may have expressed an intention to permit the
principles inherent in a remedy for "fault" to be asserted. Comparative fault,
developed as a modification of contributory negligence, is well established in
Louisiana tort law, which is based upon the duty of a person whose "fault"
causes damage to another to repair it.433 However, the development of
comparative rectitude to temper the perceived harshness of the defense of
recrimination in divorce actions overlooked the fact that comparative rectitude
was unnecessary to afford relief to the parties. As long as the law provided a
"no-fault" ground for divorce, either spouse could ultimately obtain a termination
of the marriage.
During the same session that the covenant marriage law was passed, the
legislature rejected comparing the "fault" of the two spouses when deciding
entitlement of the claimant spouse to final spousal support.434 Thus, it may be
that the legislature's intent is to authorize implicitly the defense of recrimination
in an action for divorce in a covenant marriage without the historically
complimentary doctrine of comparative rectitude. The legislature may believe
that justice requires that a divorce for "fault" be reserved for the "innocent"
ameliorate the effects of the application of the doctrine of recrimination." Spaht, supra note 110,
at 203.
431. La. Civ. Code art. 141 (repealed Jan. 1, 1991). "In 1976, the Legislature enacted Louisiana
Civil Code art. 141, which provided that a separation from bed and board 'shall be granted although
both spouses are mutually at fault in causing the separation .. .- Spaht, supra note 110, at 203.
432. Id. "Subsequently, in Thomason v. Thomason, 355 So.2d 908 (La. 1978), the court
abrogated the doctrine of recrimination in divorce suits."
433. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, 2324.
434. See House Bill No. 2053 (1997 Reg. Sess.), introduced on recommendation of theLouisiana State Law Institute. The bill as introduced "recommended that fault of the claimant spouse
not be a bar to final periodic support, but that the comparative marital misconduct, if any, of both
parties be one of the factors that a court could consider in determining the entitlement, amount, and
duration of final spousal support." Kenneth Rigby, The 1997 Spousal Support Act, 58 La. L. Rev.887, 893 (1998). The House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure rejected that provision and
adopted an amendment that eliminated the language from the bill. The series of amendments
replaced "comparative fault" with the familiar statutory formulation of fault as an absolute bar to a
claim for final spousal support (alimony after divorce). See La. Civ. Code art. 111.
For a description of the spousal support revisions, see the excellent commentary by Ribgy, supra.
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spouse (not comparatively innocent). If neither spouse is "innocent," then
they both must wait the statutory time period of two years before either
may obtain a divorce. Relief is available after the expiration of the two-year
period which is a humane outcome. However, neither spouse is entitled to relief
that adjudges one of them guilty of offensive conduct which broke up the
marriage.
B. No-Fault Grounds for Legal Separation or Divorce: Two Years Living
Separate and Apart
The covenant marriage bill as introduced did not include a "no-fault" ground
for divorce, 4" which explains why the definition of covenant marriage ignores
the possibility that such a marriage could terminate without a total breach of a
spouse's marital obligations.436 Living separate and apart for three years was
added to the bill by amendment in the Senate Committee on Judiciary A, but the
time period required for living separate and apart was reduced to two years in
conference committee before final passage of the bill.437  Living separate and
apart remains a ground for divorce in a "standard" marriage, but the statutory
time period is significantly shorter, six months. 438  Nonetheless, jurisprudence
interpreting "living separate and apart continuously" applies to both provi-
sions.4 9 The two-year period of living separate and apart restores, as Professor
Carriere observes," ° the ground for divorce under Louisiana law from 1938-
435. The bill as introduced contained only two grounds for divorce and one ground for legal
separation. House Bill No. 756. As anyone with legislative or negotiating experience knows the bill
as introduced must reflect the strongest position of the proponent so that there is room to negotiate
over amendments. This observation seems so elementary as not to deserve mention, however, critics,
particularly academic critics, have concentrated upon the harshness of the bill as introduced. See
supra authorities cited in note 424.
436. See supra discussion in text at notes 419-424 which explains in some detail the
interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:307(A) (Supp. 1998). The section begins with
"[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary" which necessarily includes Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:272(A) and also distinguishes the statutory language to describe who is entitled to a
divorce for the first four grounds and to a divorce for the fifth and sixth ground.
437. Before the bill returned to the House for concurrence in the Senate amendments it was
discovered that the Senate Committee amendments had not been properly incorporated within the
language of the bill, a clerical mistake. The bill passed by the Senate provided that grounds for
divorce included habitual intemperance and cruel treatment. Because the inclusion of such grounds
threatened to undercut the basic intention of the legislation (see Carriere, supra note 3, at 1725-26),
the House rejected the Senate amendments and the bill was sent to Conference Committee. In the
Conference Committee a compromise was reached: habitual intemperance and cruel treatment would
be grounds for legal separation only, but living separate and apart for two, rather than three, years
would be grounds for divorce.
438. La. Civ. Code art. 103(1).
439. See, eg., Adams v. Adams, 408 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1982); Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082,26
So. 2d 146 (La. 1946); Leveque v. Boms, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932).
440. Carriere, supra note 3, at 1720. She states that the divorce law under the covenant
marriage legislation closely resembles the law from 1961 to the latter 1970s. In truth, two years
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1979. What is new is that the same statutory period of living apart constitutes
a ground for separation from bed and board,441 thus affording to a spouse who
for religious reasons would never seek a divorce a ground for legal separation
even if each spouse was guilty of offensive toward the other.
C. Effect of Covenant Marriage on Incidental Demands in Divorce or
Separation Proceedings
Although a "covenant" spouse can claim the same incidental relief as a
spouse in a "standard" marriage, a strong argument can be made that the very
existence of a covenant marriage should have greater bearing upon certain
incidental relief. A "covenant" marriage should have particular impact upon
incidental demands which consider the relevancy of conduct of a spouse or of the
strength of the spouses' commitment. Spousal support, both the interim periodic
support allowance442 and final support,"' as well as child custody are exam-
ples of such incidental relief.
An interim allowance awarded to a spouse based upon her needs, his ability
to pay and their standard of living during the marriage serves the purpose of
maintaining the status quo.4" In a covenant marriage, at the option of the
"innocent" spouse, the status quo as married and the obligation to take steps to
preserve the marriage may last as long as two years. The "innocent" spouse who
is in need should be awarded a sum to maintain her as nearly as possible at the
level of their marital standard of living throughout the entire two-year period.
Additionally, if the facts justify its extension, the award should continue for an
additional one hundred eighty days after the divorce.4s The purpose of the
interim period in a covenant marriage 6 is to assure that all reasonable steps
designed to preserve the marriage have been taken. Maintaining the status quo
during the "interim" period in hopes of preserving the marriage guarantees the
optimum climate for the serious work of reconciliation. Protection against
living separate and apart was a ground for divorce from 1938 (1938 La. Acts No. 430, § I) to 1979
(1979 La. Acts No. 360, § 1).
441. La. R.S. 9:307(B)(5) (Supp. 1998).
442. La. Civ. Code art. 113.
443. La. Civ. Code arts. 111, 112.
444. La. Civ. Code art. 113, cmt. (b): "The purpose of an interim allowance is to maintain the
status quo without unnecessary economic dislocation until a determination of the amount of final
support can be made and until a period of time for adjustment elapses that does not exceed, as a
general rule, one hundred eighty days after the judgment of divorce." See also Arrendell v.
Arrendell, 390 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
445. La. Civ. Code art. 113: "The obligation to pay interim periodic support shall not extend
beyond one hundred eighty days from the rendition of judgment of divorce, except for good cause
shown." See also comment (e).
446. In many cases of"covenane' marriage the interim period will be marked by living separate
and apart rather than the period that elapses after suit for divorce is filed. See La. R.S. 9:308(A),




traumatic economic dislocation to the extent possible, particularly for the
"innocent" spouse, is justified because covenant spouses solemnly and deliberate-
ly promised a more binding commitment. The existence of a covenant marriage
justifies a generous interim allowance for the maximum time allowable.
For final periodic support, the court must consider the factor of fault of the
claimant prior to the filing of a proceeding to terminate the marriage."" The
promises of the covenant couple made after counseling and reflection should be
treated as extremely serious; and if one spouse breaches those promises, he
should suffer the consequences."" Under the jurisprudence prior to 1991, if
a spouse obtained a judgment of separation from bed and board on the basis of
the fault of the other spouse, the judgment was determinative of whose pre-
separation fault caused the dissolution of the marriage." 9 Thus, if a covenant
spouse obtains a judgment of separation from the other spouse on the basis of his
adultery, the judgment is conclusive as to whose fault causedthe separation. The
husband may not introduce evidence of his wife's fault prior to the judgment of
separation, only evidence of her fault, if any, between the judgment of separation
and filing suit for divorce. If the wife is in need based upon the criteria in
Article 112 0 and the husband is able to pay,4 ' the court should award her
final periodic support. An obvious advantage of obtaining a legal separation on
the ground of the other spouse's fault is to determine for purposes of final
support whose fault caused the separation.
Even though the jurisprudence previously distinguished between a judgment
of separation on grounds of fault and a judgment of divorce for identical reasons,
the judiciary should reconsider that distinction in the context of a "covenant"
marriage. In Lagars v. Lagars, s2 the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded:
"[W]hen there has been no judicial separation, a spouse claiming post-divorce
alimony in an action for divorce based on adultery is entitled to alimony, if in
need, if the claimant spouse obtains a judgment of divorce in his or her favor,
unless the other spouse affirmatively defends and proves that the claimant spouse
447. La. Civ. Code art. I 11.
La. Civ. Code art. 111, cmt (C):
A condition for the award of final periodic support is the claimant's freedom of faultprior
to the filing of a proceeding to terminate the marriage. Fault continues to mean
misconduct the [that] rises to the level of one of the previously existing fault grounds for
legal separation or divorce. However, unlike prior law this Article is explicit that the fault
of the claimant that precludes an award of spousal support must have occurred prior to
the filing of the "proceeding to terminate the marriage"-for example, prior to the
institution of an action for divorce.
(Citations omitted).
448. See Samuel, supra note 4, at n.20.
449. See, e.g., Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974); Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d
622 (La. 1974); Nethken v. Nethken, 307 So. 2d 563 (La. 1975). See also Bruner v. Bruner, 364
So. 2d 1015 (La. 1978).
450. La. Civ. Code art. 112. See also id. art. I11.
451. Id.
452. 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986).
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was at fault. We reach this conclusion because when there has been no judicial
separation, the divorce is the first fault determinationbetween the parties, and the
judgment of divorcebased on the adultery of the non-claimant spouse carries with
it the implication that the claimant spouse was not at fault. 4 53 Lagars was
decided after the Louisiana Supreme Court abrogated the defense of recrimination
and its corollary principle, comparative rectitude. 4 Therefore, it was possible
for a spouse to obtain a divorce from the other spouse on the ground of adultery
yet also be guilty of fault. Lagars simply shifted the burden of proof to the spouse
against whom the judgment of divorce had been rendered to prove the "alimony-
barring" fault of the claimant spouse. If, as has been argued previously,455 the
defense of recrimination is resurrected,456 then the covenant spouse who obtains
a judgment of separation or divorce on the ground of the fault of the other spouse
is "innocent" and not at fault. Both judgments should have preclusive effect: a
judgment of separation, determinative of whose fault caused the separation;4" 7
a judgment of divorce, whose fault caused the breakup of the marriage.
Fault of a covenant spouse which constitutes grounds for a separation or
divorce should also be considered relevant in decisions relating to child custody,
particularly the factor of moral fitness."" The purpose of covenant marriage
after all was to strengthen marriage, and one of the means to accomplish that
objective was society's collective judgment about unacceptable conduct within
the marital relationship. The covenant marriage law offers spouses the
opportunity to bind themselves to a stronger commitment than the law is willing
to impose. By voluntarily undertaking this commitment, permitted because in
the interest of children to be born of the union, a covenant spouse accepts
society's judgment about his behavior during the marriage. He should also
expect consequences should his behavior breach the obligations he solemnly
undertook, especially consequences as to his relationship with his children.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Western tradition has learned, through centuries of experience,
to balance the norms of marital formation, maintenance, and dissolu-
tion.... The lesson in this is that rules governing marriage formation
453. Id. at 8.
454. See supra discussion in text at notes 419-434.
455. Id.
456. The discussion in the text at supra notes 419-434 argues for the resurrection of the defense
of recrimination without the corollary of comparative rectitude so that consistently with the definition
of a covenant marriage (La. R.S. 9:272 (Supp. 1998)) only the non-breaching party could obtain a
termination of the marriage.
457. The covenant spouse against whom the judgment of separation was rendered would only
be permitted to introduce evidence of the claimant's fault committed between the judgment of
separation and filing suit for divorce.
458. La. Civ. Code art. 134(6).
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and dissolution must be comparable in their stringency .... Loose
formation rules demand loose dissolution rules, as we see today. To fix
"the modem problem of divorce" will require reforms of rules at both
ends of the marital process.459
Covenant marriage legislation accomplishes the balancing of norms of
formation, maintenance, and dissolution. It more stringently regulates the
formation ofmarriageby mandating pre-marital counseling and the executionand
filing of documents which require the participation of the counselor and a notary
public."0 By virtue of the contractual provisions in the Declaration of Intent,
covenant marriage legislation imposes the duty upon spouses to maintain their
marriage, if possible, by taking reasonable steps to preserve it.46' Last but
surely not least, covenant marriage legislation contains more stringent rules for
dissolution by divorce.462
Marriage has been described by Maggie Gallagher as the only truly heroic
act most of us, can attempt.463 Easy divorce denies us that opportunity for
heroism. Covenant marriage extends the invitation to Louisianans to be heroic,
to make a choice that represents a measure of self-sacrifice.46 Furthermore,
[a]t the present juncture in history, what may really matter is that the
Louisiana legislature has recognized the harm done by the tide of no-
fault divorce in America, and by a large majority has voted to begin the
process of reversing this tide.... Having been to the brink with
marital instability, Americans are now starting to address the basic legal
framework which has helped to undermine the institution of marriage.
Britain and other European countries could follow this example, rather
than wait until things get as bad as they are in America. 65
And, to think, Louisiana started the retreat from the precipice.
459. Witte, supra note 1, at 217-18.
460. La. R.S. 9:273(A) and (B) (Supp. 1998). See supra discussion in text at notes 97-137.
461. La. R.S. 9:273(A))(1) (Supp. 1998).
462. La. R.S. 9:307 (Supp. 1998).
463. Gallagher, Whitehead, supra note 80, at 265: "To dare to pledge our whole selves to a
single love is the most remarkable thing most of us will ever do. With the abolition of marriage that
last possibility for heroism has been taken from us."
464. Louisianans, at least, can no longer ignore the dissonance between the marriage of
our cultural imagination and marriage as it actually exists; they have a choice. It may be
that, as Dr. Peter Kramer, clinical professor psychiatry at Brown University, opines:
"contrary to claims on behalf of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage, it is out of touch with
our traditional values: self-expression, self-fulfillment, self-reliance." As Christopher
Wolfe has confirmed, "[t]he ideal of autonomy, an autonomy so broad as to preclude
fixed, permanent, lifelong commitments, is the foundation of our contemporary marriage
laws. It is a substantive moral ideal."
Spaht, supra note 17, at 277.
465. Robert Rowthom, Marriage and Trust: Some Lessons from Economics, Cambridge J. of
Econ. (forthcoming, 1998) (on file with author).
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